



ESTABLISHING A STANDARD TO ENSURE A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE CUSTODIAL SERVICE UNIT IN HANDLING HIGH-RISK PERSONALITIES

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ABSTRACT

This study assessed the different aspects of the Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit (PNP CSU) as a bases for the establishment of a standard to ensure it's highly effective and efficient in handling high-risk personalities. The study is qualitative descriptive research and made use of Focus Group Discussion (FGD) and Key Informant Interview (KII) in gathering the needed data among personnel of PNP CSU in Camp Rafael Crame, Quezon City, Philippines. The study sought answers to questions such as the current state of the PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities, the concerns that affect the PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities, and the standards that may be proposed to ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities.

The researchers applied triangulation. Documentary analysis was used which was subsequently complemented through focus group discussions with eight (8) PNP CSU personnel and five (5) former PUCs who were recently released from PNP CSU custody and validated via the key informant interview with twenty-nine (29) PNP CSU personnel and six (6) Staff Officers of HSS and LSS following Mckinsey's 7S model. The study revealed that there were several concerns from the respondents under each 7S element, and all these elements have to be considered together as interdependence among the elements is an essence of this model, and a change in one affects all others (mindtools.com). Strategy concerns were on the denial of requests for provision of additional personnel, denial of requests for equipment procurement, security plans may have been strictly implemented, but not all the time, and no regular review, rehearsal, and implementation monitoring



mechanism of security plans. On the structure, the concerns were PNP CSU personnel are being deployed for non-PNP CSU tasks despite its lack of personnel, and communications, and other concerns already addressed to Intelligence and Investigation Division, HSS are not acted upon outright by that Division but still passed on to PNP CSU. Regarding systems, the concerns were equipment unavailability, lack of a mechanism to ensure regular maintenance of equipment, no regular security plans rehearsal, and implementation monitoring, hesitation of PNP CSU personnel to conduct cell search; not all visitors are thoroughly searched, existing minimum ratio of escort of 1:1+1 to PUC during court hearings and similar activities involving the latter outside PNP CSU facility is oftentimes insufficient, and no faithful compliance on the submission of after activity reports incorporating lessons learned after each activity. Pertaining to shared values, the lone concern was small issues regarding duty shifts. There was likewise lone concern on the style of leadership, which pertains to the call for PNP CSU leadership to consider suggestions of teams. Concerning staff, the issue pertains to an insufficient number of personnel that may be assigned to the different positions in PNP CSU, its personnel are not included in combat duty pay beneficiaries, and barracks are likewise being used by PNP personnel of other units/offices. With respect to skills, the concerns were that not all personnel have skills on competency trainings and lack of programs for continuing trainings and education relevant to handling high-risk personalities.

Based on the findings of the study, conclusions were actually drawn per element of the McKinsey 7S model that was found necessary in order to ensure the high effectiveness and efficiency of the PNP CSU. Therefore on strategy, it is necessary to ensure personnel sufficiency (minimum of 88 PNP CSU personnel), ensure equipment sufficiency (by providing PNP CSU with the minimum equipment identified in the proposed TEA and to ensure enhanced security (through semi-annual review and rehearsal of security plans; and strict implementation and monitoring). On structure, PNP CSU personnel's call to be spared from deployment to non-PNP CSU functions has to be considered. Regarding systems, there is a need to ensure ready availability of sufficient equipment with a mechanism to ensure proper maintenance, amend the minimum ratio of 1:1+1 escort to PUC to 150% of escorts to increase escorts, and make the requirement more definitive. Any fraction should be rounded off to the next higher number of security escorts; conduct security plan rehearsal, as may be



necessary; and ensure strict implementation and monitoring per activity. On shared values, adherence to PNP Core Values, good attitude, harmony, and accountability to guide the behavior and actions of PNP CSU personnel. Concerning style of leadership, sustain leadership style being practiced by PNP CSU leadership befitting the peculiarities of the situation and giving due consideration to the suggestions of subordinates. With respect to staff, filling-up of all vacant authorized positions in accordance with the minimum number of PNP CSU personnel of 88, including PNP CSU personnel among the beneficiaries of Combat Duty Pay or equivalent benefits/allowances, and ensuring the exclusive use by PNP CSU personnel of their barracks were found necessary. And on skills, programming and implementing relevant trainings are inevitable.

Given the foregoing findings and conclusions of the study, the adoption of the measures under each element of McKinsey 7S of strategy, structure, system, shared values, style of leadership, staff, and skill is recommended. Under Strategy, it is recommended to ensure personnel sufficiency at PNP CSU (minimum of 88 PNP CSU personnel) – the Chief PNP CSU must submit a request for the Director, HSS who must, in turn, submit to the Directorate for Personnel and Records Management (DPRM) for the recruitment of new police officers (PO1) or the reassignment to PNP CSU of personnel from other PNP offices/units to improve the manpower of PNP CSU; Ensure equipment sufficiency (by providing PNP CSU with the minimum equipment identified in the proposed – Chief, PNP CSU must submit to the Director, HSS who must, in turn, endorse to the Directorate for Logistics (DL) the proposed TEA for the approval subsequent endorsement by the Chief PNP and the final approval by the NAPOLCOM. TEA will give a more concrete and compelling basis for the procurement and issuance of identified PNP CSU equipment (including the direly needed additional vehicles) for the use of the latter notwithstanding a change in PNP leadership; and Ensure enhanced security (through semi-annual review and rehearsal of security plans; and strict implementation and monitoring) – this will ensure that security plans are attuned and responsive to the demands and peculiarities of the changing time and circumstances. On Structure, PNP CSU personnel may be considered for deployment to non-PNP CSU functions but on the last priority basis – this will not only spare to some extent PNP CSU personnel from over exhaustion due to overwork but likewise will allow them to concentrate their efforts and energy to highly dangerous custodial functions. On Systems, ensure ready



availability of sufficient equipment with a mechanism to ensure proper maintenance – this will create the ideal situation where the PNP CSU has at its disposal vital equipment when the need arises and avoid the situation where it still has to request for their availability especially of vehicles from HSS or LSS in order to transport PUCs for court hearings, etc. or to rush them to the hospital during emergency medical conditions; 150% of escorts to PUCs during court hearings – being the minimum, any fraction should, therefore, be rounded off to the higher whole number of security escorts. This will also make more definitive and higher the ratio of security escorts to the number of PUCs as compared to the present of 1:1+1 which is rather confusing and not easily to understood; and Conduct security plan rehearsal, as may be necessary; and ensure strict implementation and monitoring per activity – this is to ensure mastery as regards the role of the respective members of the security contingents to expect a smooth execution of the security plan during its actual implementation. On Shared Values, adoption by PNP CSU of pro-God, pro-country, pro-people, pro-environment, good attitude, harmony, and accountability as its shared values – the PNP CSU emphasized here good attitude and harmony, despite that by implication the PNP core values when observed religiously would result necessarily to good attitude and harmony, this is because PNP CSU functions are highly dangerous. Yet, team efforts are critical, so its personnel must work hand-in-hand to ensure the accomplishment of its objectives. Accountability was added as a caveat to take full responsibility and be answerable over one's actions or inactions which deviate or fall short from its standards. On Style of Leadership, PNP CSU leadership to sustain leadership style being practiced befitting the peculiarities of the situation and giving due consideration to the suggestions of subordinates – this affirms that there is no single leadership style that is best applicable in all situations in PNP CSU; even autocratic leadership has its perfect time in PNP CSU leadership particularly in emergency situations where time defines the success or failure in its operation. However, when the situation allows, suggestions of subordinates should be considered given their expertise acquired through the length of their experiences in the discharge of PNP CSU functions. On Staff, fill-up all vacant authorized positions following the minimum number of PNP CSU personnel of 88 – this is to ensure that the PNP CSU will function smoothly as far as human resources is concerned. This necessitates putting the right person at the right job giving due regard to the preferences of the personnel as well as their career development; Include CSU personnel



among the beneficiaries of Combat Duty Pay or equivalent benefits/allowances – this will boost their morale that could translate to high-quality outputs; while PNP CSU is under an administrative mother unit (HSS) and it is not engaging in offensive actions in the discharge of its duties, the danger, however, is even higher in PNP CSU, if not the same as those in operational units of the PNP. It is a fact the inoffensive operation, the operating units dictate and control of at least the time, place, and manner of operation. Still, the PNP CSU is in the defensive position, and it is the lawless elements who wish to stage a rescue or ambush who are in the offensive position. When these lawless elements engage the PNP CSU, the latter cannot refuse combat as it is obligated to fight back at least a defensive combat. Therefore, PNP CSU is in a more dangerous position than those operating units of the PNP. Accordingly, PNP CSU personnel deserve combat duty pay entitlement. And ensure the exclusive use by PNP CSU personnel of their barracks – this is rather basic due to security reasons and to avoid unnecessary congestion in the barracks that runs contrary to habitability. And, on Skills, to program and implement relevant trainings for continuing skills development to PNP CSU personnel – this is very important since PNP CSU is handling high-risk personalities the danger against the lives of the security escorts as well as the PUCs is very high so higher level of competencies in handling high-risk personalities are really necessary to ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU.

KEYWORDS: High-risk personalities; standards; custodial service unit; effective and efficient police leadership; Philippine National Police

I. INTRODUCTION

“The quality of a leader is reflected in the standards they set for themselves.” Ray Kroc. This passage depicts the importance of having a standard for a leader as it is determinative of the kind of leader he is. The success or failure, therefore, of the group under leadership is similarly portrayed by the kind of leader it has. By definition, the standard is something set up and established by authority as a rule for the measure of quantity, weight, extent, value, or quality (meriam-webster.com). Necessarily, standard is set not as a benchmark to maintain status quo but as a baseline towards a quest for growth



or improvement. Although worded differently, this passage equally applies to organizations in place of a leader. Thus it is equally important that organizations like the Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit (PNP CSU) should have standards to be used as a touchstone to determine the quantity and quality of its accomplishments. It is along this line that these Researchers were prompted in coming up with this study to establish a standard to ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities not only in their day-to-day performance of duties and responsibilities, but likewise in situations of emergencies, including riots, jailbreaks, and other similar incidents within and without its facility in Camp Crame particularly during escorting activities so that the PNP CSU personnel, the community, and the persons under custody (PUCs) will have higher safety and security in connection with the operations of the PNP CSU.

Nowadays, given the program priorities of the current administration, including the stringent campaign against graft and corruption, other forms of criminality, and dangerous drugs, which are being implemented by the different law enforcement agencies of the government, through varying programs, including the internal cleansing efforts of the PNP against its “*scalawag*” members, there is a greater likelihood that big personalities involved in said crimes will be arrested and the PNP CSU might be used for their custody. Hence the relevance of this research becomes even more apparent. As a matter of fact, while writing this paper, a notorious leader of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), who allegedly has an intimate relationship with a lady police officer PSUPT MARIA CHRISTINA NOBLEZA of the PNP Crime Laboratory Group, was arrested and subsequently placed under PNP CSU custody so with PSUPT NOBLEZA. The ASG had been notorious in kidnapping for ransom operating principally in the Southern part of the Philippines, victimizing wealthy individuals who are mostly foreign nationals. Aside from kidnapping for ransom, the ASG had been involved in acts of terrorism, including bombings.

It is beyond dispute that criminality respects no jurisdiction, and it does happen in every country. In addressing criminality, detention of perpetrators often is inevitable.

In custodial facilities, managers or administrative officers all over the world, including the prominent jails, avoid one of the worst curses—and that is the escape of a prisoner or prisoners. From the legendary Alcatraz to the present-day Guantanamo in Cuba and Yarl's Wood in UK, the escape of prisoners had been one of the hottest topics. However, there are



those everyday problems like preventing riots or preventing threats during prisoner transport. There are also other challenges, such as riots and acts of terrorism that disrupt the management of the jails or custodial facilities. As a response, these facilities obtain and adapt equipment and technologies to prevent these threats. At present, the sophistication of technologies led to auto-lock prison cells and doors and a continuous monitoring system through closed-circuit televisions (CCTVs). In the case of disruptions in the jail or custodial facilities, strategies have been readied for quick response by the personnel.

Patterson (2004) argues that “a successful security concept for protecting facilities today emphasizes a growing awareness of technological developments and emphasizes the integration of architectural aspects, security systems, and human resources and procedures so that they can be more effective. Threat levels change from time to time and need to be considered when determining security measures for facilities. Operational procedures tailored to each threat level must be developed. Failure to consider the threat levels, operational procedures, and the human element properly when designing and installing new integrated security systems can turn a viable concept into an operational quagmire. Facility managers can avoid this by ensuring that their plans for security systems contain a complete analysis of how the systems will be operated and how the security forces will respond to security violations” (Patterson, 2004: 64).

In the Philippines, the systems of jails and detention or lock-up facilities are: “the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), Correctional Institute for Women (CIW), and the different penal farms and colonies under Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR) of the Department of Justice (DOJ); different Provincial Jails still under the direct supervision of their respective Governors; Rehabilitation Centers for Children In Conflict with the Law (CICL) under the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD); District jails, City jails, Municipal jails and some of the turned-over Provincial Jails thru memorandums of agreement under the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG); lock-up or detention jails of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and PNP; and rehabilitation centers under the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)” (Magsino, 2014: 1-2). The various facilities have different needs and different threat levels assessed on them.



In the Philippine National Police, it maintains at its National Headquarters in Camp Crame, the PNP CSU. Historically, the PNP CSU formerly named "*PookBinbinan*" during PC/INP (Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police) time was established to handle "high-risk" personalities who are under custody for crime commission.

"The PNP CSU is an institution within the PNP NHQ that provides custody of detainees, thereby affording for their safety and preventing their escape while awaiting the courts' disposition of their cases or transfer to appropriate penal or rehabilitative facilities. The HSS administers and operates the PNP CSU. Its responsibilities are not limited to the confines of the Custodial Center, but extend to escorting detainees, as ordered by competent authorities, and to the hospitals where the detainees may be confined for health reasons" (Manual of Operations 2012 Edition, HSS).

Pursuant to General Orders Number DPL 04-01, the then PNP Custodial Center (PNPCC), which is now the PNP CSU, was reactivated effective February 1, 2004 under the Headquarters Support Service (HSS) to provide security and escort to detainees while under investigation and/or under trial pursuant to Court Order. In the same year, the NAPOLCOM upgraded the PNP Custodial Center, from a mere section to division level, as a separate unit of the HSS finding it cost-effective to secure a single detention facility rather than several detention facilities (Magsino, 2014).

At present, the PNP CSU is headed by the Chief, PNP CSU, who has an Assistant Chief. The PNP CSU has two branches, the Administration and Special Support Section, and the Security and Escort Section.

The principal functions of the PNP CSU are the following: (a) Implements existing policies, rules and regulations pertaining to custody and security of arrested persons; (b) Takes custody of and provides security and escort services primarily to high-risk personalities while under investigation or awaiting disposition of their cases; (c) Takes custody of and provides escort and security in transporting arrested high-risk personalities to court hearings and other destinations as ordered by competent authorities; (d) Takes custody of and provides escort security to arrested high-risk personalities confined at the hospitals for health reasons; and (e) Ensures and maintains the good condition of custodial facilities.

Along this line and considering that the PNP CSU primarily handles the so-called "high-risk"



personalities who are under custody, its equipage must correspond to the level of risk that the PNP CSU personnel are facing in the performance of their duties. This is to ensure the safety and security of said personnel, the community, and the persons under their custody, especially in transporting the latter from PNP CSU home-based in Camp Crame to and from the courts and similar bodies anywhere in the Philippines.

To cite a few, the PNP CSU had handled the custody of former President Joseph Estrada, former Senators Juan Ponce Enrile, Jinggoy Estrada, Ramon “Bong” Revilla Jr, 19 Magdalo soldiers, PNP Generals, 300 Pasig ShabuTiangge suspects, Communist Party of the Philippines/ New People’s Army/ National Democratic Front leaders, “Maguindanao Massacre” suspects, Atimonan Quezon suspects and other high-risk personalities. This also includes the newly detained Senator Leila De Lima, who is charged of a drug case and the suspects in the “*tokhang-for-ransom*” and murder of Jee Ick-Joo, a South Korean national having business in Angeles City, who allegedly was strangled to death by some members of the PNP Anti- Illegal Drug Group (PNP AIDG) and other civilian agents inside Camp Crame.

The average number of detainees in the PNP CSU has been 70, as can be inferred from the study of Magsino (2014:6). At present, the PNP CSU has 57 personnel out of its 186 approved strength, but in the performance of its routinary function of escorting persons under custody for hearings in court or the Department of Justice, or in bringing to medical facilities, PNP CSU would always request for augmentation of personnel, firearms, radios, and vehicles since PNP CSU personnel, vehicle, firearms and other equipment are not enough. Concerning equipment, PNP CSU already has requests and “wish list” for procurement of equipment that it needs, but despite thereof, PNP CSU still has only one vehicle which it is using to transport PUCs.

In all of the foregoing instances of requesting for equipment or personnel augmentation, the process had always been difficult for the PNP CSU simply because nothing or no one is dedicated to it. Approval of its requests and availability of the personnel or equipment being requested would often require relentless follow-ups more so if the PNP CSU only has a concise time left since courts, especially in urgent cases, still issue an order to bring persons under custody before it on the very next day/s. Even furthermore problematic on the part of the PNP CSU is during emergency situations requiring, for example, persons under custody to be brought to the nearest hospital when its lone vehicle



is already engaged outside of Camp Crame, it is left with no other vehicle to transport promptly said person to the nearest hospital. Under this similar situation that paved the way for the former patrolman and PUC Rizal Ali to face his creator as he was brought to PNP General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival on August 15, 2015.

With respect to training, it may be said that PNP CSU personnel possess relevant trainings but without intensive and focused trainings on custodial operations since their training about it is just an orientation course (personal interview of PNP CSU staff). Additionally, the acquisition of new equipment might require new trainings to ensure the effective and efficient use of the equipment.

Notwithstanding the previous insufficiency in terms of personnel and equipment as well as interventions of addressing these concerns and improving PNP CSU operations, the fact remains that there exists no standard in ensuring the high effectiveness and efficiency of the PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities. Yes, there had been a lot of interventions to address the concerns of PNP CSU to improve its operations, and PNP CSU had been manned and equipped, though experience and records are telling us that the human resources and equipment are still insufficient, thus the necessity for manpower and equipment augmentation particularly during PUC escorting outside PNP CSU facility, but despite these realities, there exists no straightforward basis or guidelines that could be used in determining whether or not those interventions, strategies, structure, systems and procedures, shared values, leadership styles, staff, and personnel skills are correctly leading PNP CSU to be at least sustainably effective and efficient in the delivery of its public value. On the other hand, a PUC was pronounced dead on arrival on August 15, 2015, at the PNP General Hospital as cited above when there was no PNP CSU vehicle used in transporting him from said unit to the hospital; a PUC by the name of SamerPalao escaped from PNP CSU custody when he was in Cebu City for a hearing in his criminal case on March 25, 2010; and from 2010 – 2015, three (3) Chiefs of PNP CSU were relieved for violation of custodial regulations. Hence, the focus now of this study is on establishing a standard to ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities. Standards are necessary for purposes of determining whether all the courses of actions or interventions to address problems or to improve further PNP CSU operations are clearly in the right direction and correctly grounded. On the personnel sufficiency for example, the approved strength of



186 may not necessarily be leading PNP CSU towards efficiency all the time, if not most of the time, given that as of May 1, 2017 the total number of PUCs in PNP CSU is only 17 and decongestion efforts of the latter unit is continuing, which may result to further lowering of the number of PUCs. Necessarily, the minimum number of PNP CSU personnel that could still ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU has to be determined and whether or not the 186 is the minimum number for this purpose is bereft of any basis in the absence of standard. To fill this void is the trust of this study using McKinsey's 7S framework to extensively diagnose PNP CSU concerns on every element so that a standard could correspondingly be established there for.

OBJECTIVES

The study assessed the different aspects of the PNP CSU as the basis for establishing a standard to ensure it's highly effective and efficient in handling high-risk personalities. Specifically, it sought answers to the following objectives:

1. To determine the current state of the PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities;
2. To determine the concerns that affect the PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities; and
3. To establish the standards may be proposed to ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities.

Review of Related Literature

Standards on Jail Facilities. Kimme (1998) suggested the following minimum characteristics essential to attaining a better and more effective jail operational characteristics: "adequate and efficient staffing, including around-the-clock jail staff and female staffing when women are housed, staff well-trained in jail operations, the existence of written policies and procedures of operations, constant surveillance or supervision of inmates, as opposed to intermittent observation, programs and amenities through which to influence inmate behavior and alleviate idleness, the existence of inmate rules and disciplinary procedures, sufficient staffing and operational funding" (Kimme, 1998:4).

The American Bar Association (2011) enumerated the general principles governing imprisonment, in terms of the facilities such as: "a correctional facility should be safe and orderly and should be run in a fair and lawful manner; a correctional facility should maintain order and should protect prisoners from harm from other prisoners and staff; restrictions



placed on prisoners should be necessary and proportionate to the legitimate objectives for which those restrictions are imposed; a correctional facility should be appropriately staffed.; and a correctional facility should be monitored and regularly inspected by independent government entities” (ABA, 2010).

Thigpen, Hutchinson, and Barbee (2007) defined jail standards as follows: "Jail standards are specifications or benchmarks for jail operations and facilities. They may exist in the form of mandated rules and regulations established by law or voluntary guidelines established by professional associations. Jail standards typically consist of prescriptive statements that establish requirements or levels of performance for specific jail functions, activities, or conditions. These statements and the standards generally are intended to reflect legal requirements and what the field believes is "sound correctional practice." (Thigpen, Hutchinson and Barbee, 2007:1)

The World Health Organization (2007) established standards for health in prisons: "Developing a whole-prison or settings approach to promoting health is important for improving the chances of intervention succeeding. The vision for a health-promoting prison is based on a balanced approach recognizing that prisons should be safe, secure, reforming, and health-promoting, grounded in the concept of decency and respect for human rights" (WHO, 2007:17).

In relation to the standards for sleeping facilities, the UN Office of Drugs and Crimes (2015) adopted these Mandela rules: Where sleeping accommodation is in individual cells or rooms, each prisoner shall occupy by night a cell or room by himself or herself. If for special reasons, such as temporary overcrowding, it becomes necessary for the central prison administration to make an exception to this rule, it is not desirable to have two prisoners in a cell or room. 2. Where dormitories are used, they shall be occupied by prisoners carefully selected as being suitable to associate with one another in those conditions. There shall be regular supervision by night, in keeping with the nature of the prison" (UNODC, 2015:5).

Facilities Security and Enhancement of Facilities. Dai, Hu, and Cai (2011) argued that security systems have a positive effect on social security as an important public safety technology platform these years. Meantime, some problems with these security systems have gradually emerged. For example, "some security systems become vulnerable or even useless because of irrational allocation of protection resources according to the original



irrational design. The irrational allocation of people protection, physical protection, and electronic protection lead some security systems unable to complete their protection tasks. They added that the effectiveness of the security system referred to achieving the desired target when it was used to implement the protection task under specific conditions" (Dai, Hu and Cai, 2011: 1).

Jarrett (2003) argued that improving security involves the consideration of many factors, ranging from adding security personnel to adding automated controls at entrances and exits. "With each option of whether the facility manager needs to increase personnel or improve equipment automation comes additional factors to study, thereby making security improvement a deliberate process that involves weighing both practical and financial considerations." (Jarrett, 2003:1)

Murphy (2005) proposed that addressing existing facility issues can be accomplished by first establishing the importance of the need for security, optimizing existing security measures, and laying the groundwork for later enhancements. Longer-term enhancements can be accomplished by developing an action plan, implementing the necessary procedures and policies, and apportioning the appropriate funds for capital improvements.

The study of Then and Loosemore (2006) suggested that facilities managers "underestimated the vulnerability of buildings to a terrorist attack, might have a misconception about likely targets and might be unprepared for such an eventuality. Their findings were restricted to sample facilities managers interviewed who were responsible for a range of major public and private buildings in Sydney, Australia. The study highlighted the security responsibilities of facilities managers in the new security environment and practical measures which can be taken to improve terrorism preparedness, recovery and response" (Then and Loosemore, 2006: 157).

Quick Response. The paper of Stollendorf (2008) on rapid response pertained to rapid response teams in hospitals. However, his arguments can be adopted in adopting a quick response team in the PNP CSU. He proposed that "It is therefore prudent that policies at the national and organizational level are developed... to deploy these teams in the best possible way to reach the best outcomes. Policies that address (a) standardization of Rapid Response



Teams (RRTs), (b) funding for research, (c) development of evidence-based practice guidelines, (d) staff training and development, (e) risk management, and (f) support systems for RRTs are all necessary" (Stolldorf, 2008: 122).

Arnatt and Beyerlein (2014) cited that "law enforcement special operations teams (e.g., Special Weapons and Tactics Teams (SWAT), Swift, Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), and Strategic Response Teams (SRT) were charged with resolving difficult situations that pose a threat to all involved. Recent tragedies strengthen the idea that law enforcement special operations teams play a critical role in the maintenance of public safety. Despite the importance of police special operations teams, there is virtually no empirical research specifically addressing leadership within these teams. The study concluded that operational knowledge, experience through reflection (debriefings), repeated trainings, and situational involvement of leaders had been shown to be crucial in effective team outcomes. However, it would appear that the less obvious interpersonal skills of how a person presents themselves to others as a reflection of their true self, how they convey their ethical code, the belief in their ability to navigate disaster situations, and their sociability are also critically important" (Arnatt and Beyerlein, 2013: 438).

Subramaniam, Ali, and Shamsudin (2010) proposed a framework for understanding the antecedents of emergency response performance. "Emergency response is vital in cases of emergencies, as prompt and speedy services determine the difference between life and death. Emergency responders normatively work in a team and in concert to ensure that mitigation efforts can be accomplished to reduce the loss of life and property. As such, emergency responders must perform tasks at hand as efficiently as possible as a team. The paper discussed possible antecedents that determined an emergency response team's performance and offered a conceptual framework based on Robbin's model of group behavior and the existing literature to explain emergency response team performance. The evidence suggested that there were some bases to link team member resources and team structure with team performance, particularly to emergency responders who typically have to work interdependently with each other" (Subramaniam, Ali, and Shamsudin, 2010: 556).

Crowe (2008) argued that "local emergency managers in the United States (emphasis supplied) are often limited by lack of funding or dependency on grants, which can lead to planning and preparedness challenges. Moreover, emergency managers are often also



hampered by political hurdles, including unsupportive political supervision and multiple job functions covered by one person. These types of limitations make a response to any challenge difficult, much less responding to an event with the scope and scale of low probability, high consequence (LPHC) incident" (Crowe, 2008: 1).

McElligot (2007) commented that "aside from being outnumbered, prison guards in the US were usually unarmed as they walked among inmates, and so must rely on support from elsewhere should the need arise. Depending on the seriousness of the incident, this may mean hailing co-workers away from their posts, or calling in a specially trained (and armed) tactical squad. Either move takes time, and relies on properly functioning channels of communications, responsive managers, and a certain degree of frontline solidarity. Meanwhile, prisoners may have at their disposal a variety of unpleasant or potentially deadly weapons that they can wield almost immediately" (McElligot, 2007: 81).

Spierer (2010) made a study determining if a gender influence exists on athletes' responses to auditory stimuli and visual stimuli. The major finding indicated that "men, as compared with women, demonstrate a decreased transit time and an increased transit speed in response to visual stimuli and auditory stimuli. Additionally, the data of the study suggested that men were quick to respond to a visual stimulus rather than auditory stimuli. However, acceleration and reaction times did not show significant differences related to gender" (Spierer, 2010: 957).

The exploratory, descriptive study by Santos, Lane and Gover (2012) of former inmates found that "the nine methods of informal control (not told when it was relaxing count; forced to remain sitting during relax count; not having the phone on for inmate use; not allowed the full minutes of phone usage; being forced to rush during eating; shortened access to the yard; reduced access to smoking during recess time; reduced access to the canteen; and being yelled at) examined occurred in prison and jail, and up to half of the respondents felt that these methods were effective at controlling inmates. Roughly one-third or more of the respondents reported experiencing all nine methods of informal control examined in this study sometimes or more during their previous confinement. A similar percentage reported witnessing other inmates being punished with these methods of informal social control. In general, the prison participants were more likely to report that both the experiencing and witnessing of the methods. Additionally, in general, about one-



third of respondents felt these informal approaches to control were effective. The approach considered most effective by prison inmates was reduced access to the canteen, and the method considered most effective jail-only inmates were not getting access to their full minutes of phone usage" (Santos, Lane and Gover, 2012: 485).

Security Management. Gould (2007) presented results from a pilot case study comparing the effects of court security in two modern and highly respected metropolitan county court systems. "Although federal and state courts have paid increasing attention to security in their buildings and operations, little formal evaluation has been conducted of the effects of heightened security on court operations or court users, including judges, litigants, lawyers, jurors, and the general public. The research identified four common areas of concern, including inadequate signage and covered waiting areas at courthouse entry stations; disparities between the public's expectations of security measures and the limits of implementation; inconsistent monitoring of security measures; and gaps between heightened public expectations of security and the realities of limited resources to accomplish these tasks. If even these courts presented issues of concern, there were likely additional courts that warrant greater attention to the effects of security" (Gould, 2007:62).

May (2014) observed that "a growing body of research suggested that, according to both offenders and criminal justice practitioners, jails and correctional boot camps were viewed and experienced as significantly more punitive than prison. Nevertheless, limited research existed examining the perceptions of the public regarding jail conditions and operations. Using responses from 1,183 Kentucky adults, the author examined public opinion regarding the punitiveness of jail when compared to prison. Except for boot camp, respondents felt that jail was the most punitive noncapital sanction. Additionally, respondents who had been convicted of a felony at some point in their lives and respondents with lower household income indicated that they would serve significantly less time in jail to avoid prison than their counterparts if given the option" (May, 2014: 250) .

Roy, Novak and Miksaj-Todorovic (2010) argued that "managing prisons was one of the tough tasks for the criminal justice professionals. Especially, prison management took the toll of time and energy of many of the prison staff. There might be a tough routine, difficult prisoners, unsupportive higher-ups, critical governments, etc., which might cause



physical and mental exhaustion of the prison staff. This exhaustion led to burn out which was though common to any other type of employee working in other organizations but in a different magnitude and dimension. The issue of job burnout among prison staff was intensely studied by various researchers in several countries around the world. The study tried to compare job burnout between American and Croatian prison staff. The Maslach Burnout Inventory was used to collect data from 480 respondents in the U.S., and 442 respondents in Croatia. Results indicated severe job burnout among prison staff in both countries" (Roy, Novak and Miksaj-Todorovic, 2010:189).

Roy and Avdija (2012) examined the effect of prison security level on job satisfaction and job burnout among prison employees. It also examined the effect of job satisfaction, as an independent variable, on job burnout. "The data for the study were collected from all staff working in three prisons in the State of Indiana, USA – one maximum-security prison and two medium-security prisons. The findings showed that there was no difference in job satisfaction among prison employees who worked in the maximum-security prison compared to those who work in a medium-security prison. Additionally, the study showed that prison security level had a partial effect on job burnout among prison employees. Prison employees who worked in medium level security reported having more control over work-related activities compared to those who work in a maximum-security prison. Prison security level did not have any significant effects on emotional exhaustion and personal accomplishment. Job satisfaction, on the other hand, was inversely related to job burnout. The study showed that an increase in job satisfaction was manifested with a decrease in job burnout" (Roy and Avdija, 2012:524).

Kuo-Tsai and Bazemore (1994) attempted to understand detention care workers' (DCW) attitudes toward detained youth and the impact of this professional orientation on their job involvement. It was found out that "DCWs develop distinctive outlooks toward detainees. The treatment attitude was positively related to job involvement while the punishment was negatively related. The interpretation of these findings would be that DCWs showing more treatment-oriented attitudes toward youth will have a more positive attitude toward their job, i.e., higher levels of job involvement, and that DCWs possessing punishment-oriented attitudes toward youth will have negative attitudes toward their job, i.e, some lower levels of job involvement" (Kuo-Tsai and Bazemore, 1994: 223).



The study by Lai, Tzeng and Peng (2013) was based on three objectives: (1) surveying Taiwanese correctional officers who experienced the "get-tough-on-crime" policy during the early 2000s, (2) testing for differences in turnover intent between jail and prison officers, and (3) examining personal and workplace environmental factors to determine whether distinct turnover intent exists among prison and jail officers. "A self-report survey administered to 799 Taiwanese correctional officers demonstrated that jail and prison officers had moderately high levels of turnover intent with no significant difference. When turnover intent correlates were further examined, job dangerousness, organizational harmony, and commitment were significant predictors for both prison and jail officers, thus suggesting that environmental factors have the most robust impact. In terms of personal characteristics, tenure and position were significantly related to prison officers' turnover intent. Conversely, age represented a significant factor among jail respondents" (Lai, Tzeng and Peng, 2013: 213).

Lai, Wang, and Kellar (2013) argued that "although workplace victimization and safety of law enforcement officers were a growing issue in the context of the criminal justice system, there had been very limited research of work-related safety in correctional settings. A similar situation also occurred in Taiwan. Recognizing that public fear of crime was composed of affective and cognitive dimensions, the study broke the concept of perceived workplace fear into three measurable dimensions: workplace safety, fear of victimization by (ex)inmates, and fear of victimization by (ex)coworkers. Each of them was examined by considering respondents' individual and organizational characteristics. Using data collected by a self-reported survey of 348 Taiwanese correctional officers, the primary findings suggested that, of those personal characteristics, custody, prison, and jail were significantly related to perceived workplace safety. In addition, personal victimization experience, trust in supervisors, and training related to emergency situations had the greatest impacts on perceived workplace safety and victimization among those explanatory factors" (Lai, Wang and Kellar, 2013: 1).

Custodial Service Unit Management in the Philippines. De Leon (2007) conducted a study on the management of security at the PNP Custodial Center (PNPCC). The respondents agreed that primary concerns were the lack of training of Custodial Group personnel in



custodial management; the insufficient number of personnel manning the Custodial Center; the insufficiency in the number of female personnel assigned with the PNPCC to conduct body searches to female detainees and visitors, the insufficient facilities available to serve the needs of the detainees; that there were no sufficient resources to support the operation of the PNPCC; that the personnel were not dedicated in their responsibility in providing security; and that there was a need for the PNP Custodial Group to be integrated into the formal structure of the PNP.

Magsino (2014) assessed the PNPCC operations as basis for strengthening its security plan to present detainees. The major problem of the PNPCC was assessed from the insufficient and lack of upgraded security equipment necessary for modern security facilities and the lack of provision of highly-secured transport vehicles and system. Personnel attachment also compounded the threat to the security system of the PNPCC. The proposed measures to address the problems confronting the PNPCC operations were establishing a communication and security control center; setting up CCTV at entry/exit points and other important areas and place luminous exterior lightings at the walls and interior lighting along the corridors; designing a Unit Identification System distinct from visitor's passes card; formulating procedures on the access of off-duty inside PNPCC detention compound; and requesting HSS to provide additional personnel in case of immediate needs for security escort service.

Malana (2016) concluded that the capability standard expected among the security personnel of the PNPCC required high physical, psychological, and emotional attributes. The skills of the personnel need updating through advanced seminars and training. The responsibilities of the personnel of the PNPCC were risky and needing support in logistical and mobility aspects. There were internal and external concerns or problems that affected their performance of duty, but the personnel was enthusiastic in proposing measures to overcome these concerns and problems. The factors on the stay or release of detainees were beyond the scope of authority of the personnel of the PNPCC as court orders usually determined them.

Synthesis and Gaps

The literature review was divided into five sections—standards for jail facilities,



facilities security and enhancement of facilities, quick response, security management, and PNP CSU management in the Philippines.

There were several books that proposed standards for the different aspects of jails, correctional facilities, or detention centers. Kimme (1998) proposes the minimum characteristics for jail operations, which were similar to the many features discussed in the standardization of the PNP CSU. The American Bar Association (2010) published their guidelines in treatment of prisoners. The requirements for facilities were highlighted in the review. Thigpen, Hutchinson and Barbee (2007) argued that jail standards must reflect legal standards and sound correctional practice. Health-promoting prisons were the focus of the World Health Organization (2007). The Mandela rules provided standards for sleeping facilities, as discussed in the book of the UN Office of Drugs and Crimes (2015).

In facilities security, the work of Dai, Hu and Cai (2011) emphasized security systems have a positive effect on social security. Concerning the PNP CSU security, the detainment of high-profile criminals in it makes the society having one less criminal or suspect. Jarrett (2003), however, would make one realize that securing facilities required automation but with a higher financial burden. Here comes the argument whether the PNP should automate the PNP CSU and use taxpayers' money when, in fact, it would have to detain people most likely not liked by society. Murphy (2005), on the other hand, proposed a gradual increase in the security system. So, if PNP CSU had to automate, it would not be a one-time project, but it would be adopted as the need arises. Then and Loosemore (2006) must be an eye-opener for the security managers and personnel of the PNP CSU. As the facility houses several suspected terrorists, it would always be a prime target for their fellow terrorists, either for retaliation or freeing their fellow, especially when in transit to a court or vice versa. This study was relevant because it would highlight the need for quick response teams and standardized equipment for the personnel and the PNP CSU facility.

One of the main topics is a quick response. Stollford (2008) discussed rapid response in hospital settings, but the policies were also applicable for PNP CSU, such as standardization, research, practice guidelines, staff training and development, and support systems. The idea that the PNP CSU develops its own special operations team (SOT) was supported by Arnatt and Beyerlein (2013). This SOT can be activated for quick response in case of riots, terrorist attacks, or ambushes. Quick response could also be understood more reading the literature



on emergency response performance, as written by Subramaniam, Ali, and Shamsudin (2010). However, local emergency managers, like the administrators of the PNP CSU, usually lack funds to have quick response units, as discussed by Crowe (2008). The need for quick response becomes so glaring, especially with the observation of McElligot (2007) that correctional officers in the US were usually unarmed and outnumbered. The study of Spierer (2010) can also be a good reference when considering the gender of guards for PNP CSU. To quell disruptive behaviors, the personnel of the PNP CSU can learn the nine methods of informal control discussed by Santos, Lane and Gover (2012).

Security management was also discussed as this covered the concepts of quick response and equipment standardization in PNP CSU. Important concepts were discussed by Gould (2007) such as inadequate signage and covered waiting area; public's expectations of security measures and the limits of implementation, inconsistent monitoring of security measures, and gaps between heightened public expectations of security and the realities of limited resources. May (2014) found out that jail was the most punitive non-capital sanction, and that detainees might want to rather stay in detention centers. One of the threats to personnel was job burnout, as presented by the study of Roy, Novak, and Miksaj-Todorovic (2010). To answer this, there should be measures to increase job satisfaction in the PNP CSU, as suggested by Roy and Avdija (2012). More involvement in the job could lead to favorable treatment of detainees, as found out by Kuo-Tsai and Bazemore (1994). Workplace environment was a big factor in employee turn-over, as presented by Lai, Tzeng, and Peng (2013), and this should also be addressed in the PNP CSU. Lai, Wang, and Kellar (2013) also gave importance to workplace safety as one big factor for the welfare of the personnel.

In addition, the studies of De Leon (2007), Magsino (2014), and Malana (2016) provided real insights on the PNP CSU in terms of security management, security planning, and capability standards for personnel, which until now most of their recommendations were not implemented.

This present study will fill the gap on the need for standardization for the PNP CSU, and the need for quick response capabilities among the personnel.

Conceptual Framework

In establishing a standard to ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities, the McKinsey's 7S Model is adopted. Necessarily, the conceptual framework of this study is an enhancement from the original concept of this model. Thus the original Mckinsey 7S Model is shown in Figure 1, while the conceptual framework of this study is shown in Figure 2 below.




Figure 1. The Mckinsey 7S Model

The basic premise of the model is that there are seven internal aspects of an organization that need to be aligned if it is to be successful. This success is guaranteed by ensuring that all the parts of the organization work in harmony.

The seven internal aspects or “elements” are referring to the so-called "seven (7) S" or simply "7S" which stands for strategy, structure, systems, shared values, style, staff, and skills.

McKinsey's 7S Model describes the elements as follows: “strategy - the plan devised to maintain and build competitive advantage over the competition; structure - the way the organization is structured and who reports to whom; systems - the daily activities and procedures that staff members engage in to get the job done; shared values - the core values of the company that are evidenced in the corporate culture and the general work ethics; style - the style of leadership adopted; staff - the employees and their general capabilities; and skills - the actual skills and competencies of the employees working for the company.”

The adoption of the different elements of the Mckinsey 7S model in the context of the PNP CSU as shown in Figure 2 below becomes the conceptual framework of this study.




Figure 2: Conceptual Framework for establishing a standard to ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities

The big circle to which the McKinsey 7S is anchored is a gold rope ring signifying that the PNP CSU should be bound together as highlighted by harmony in its core and shared values. The gold color of the ring manifests the high importance of PNP CSU functions that should genuinely be treasured as it contributes to security and ultimately to the national well-being when joined with development and good governance. The ring likewise symbolizes and emphasizes the significance of unity and teamwork in PNP CSU, given the highly critical and dangerous nature of its job that inevitably rests and counts upon the faithful outputs of every member of the team. Upon the totality, therefore, of the entire PNP CSU should the whole aspects of the McKinsey model be looked into in establishing a standard to ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU to expect a smooth operation of the PNP CSU as an organization.

In terms of strategy, the study will review the overall mission, vision, and the objectives of the PNP CSU and analyze whether they need to be modified, changed, or be unchanged. The structure of PNP CSU needs to be reviewed whether there are needs for realignment or strengthening. Addressing security issues, custodial facilities, and equipment are some of the primary concerns of the security system that need to be reviewed. In the



shared values element, the PNP CSU needs to look at the work ethics and culture of all the personnel. The quest for standard must also look for the most appropriate leadership style for a custodial unit. The establishment of standards must also look at the staff, their general capabilities, and their needs. The skills or the competencies of the PNP CSU staff, especially in security operations, must also be reviewed.

II. METHODOLOGY

The research design was qualitative as the inputs from the respondents were summarized and analyzed. The study was conducted in the PNP CSU, Camp Crame, Quezon City, Philippines. The focus group discussions were done in two (2) groups. The first group was among Police Non-Commissioned Officers (PNCOs) and the Supervisor of the Security and Escort Personnel of the PNP CSU, and the second group was done among the five (5) former PUCs who were recently released from PNP CSU custody.

Table 1. Population of the Study

Designation	Frequency	Percentage
Police Commissioned Officers	10	14.71
Office Personnel (PNCOs & NUP)	13	19.12
Sergeants of the Guard (PNCOs)	4	5.88
Perimeter Guards (PNCOs)	19	27.94
Security and Escort Personnel (PNCOs)	13	19.12
Tower Guards (PNCOs)	4	5.88
PUCs	5	7.35
Total	68	100.00

The initial stage of data collection was in getting the permission of the Director of the Headquarters Support Service being the mother unit of the PNP CSU. Upon getting the approval, a letter was also sent to the Chief, PNP CSU, for the conduct of the Key Informant Interview (KII), Focus Group Discussion (FGD), and relevant document analysis.



February 6, 2017, request for FGD, and KII involving PNP CSU personnel was received and approved by Headquarters Support Service. The FGD and KII were not immediately conducted because of the scheduled class in DAP for the remaining subjects of the Researchers. On February 24, 2017, the researchers had a courtesy call to the Chief, PNP CSU, and thereafter conducted document gathering about the topic.

FGD was scheduled on March 3, 2017, but when researchers proceeded at the PNP CSU for the said activity, the C, CSU postponed the FGD because of their busy schedules because of the arrival of its new PUC in the person of Senator Leila De Lima at the PNP CSU facility. The FGD was reset on the following week, but for the second time, the scheduled day was moved because of the scheduled Greyhound operations conducted at the cells of the PUCs and, at the same time, the release of the PSUPT Hanzel Marantan and his group who were on bail.

FGD was conducted on March 7, 2017, with the key personnel of the PNP CSU as participants/respondents in which every participant was at ease in providing answers and in-depth insights on the questions of the researchers. The participants were comfortable with the Researchers using their own words and lingo since one of the researchers was one of their former officemates.

Results from the FGD were consolidated by the researchers, and guide questions were prepared for further validation through KII with the 29 PNP CSU personnel, including the Police Commissioned Officers of said office and 6 Staff Officers of HSS and LSS as respondents to the guide questions.

On April 4, 2017, another request was given to HSS specifying the Division Chiefs of HSS as their key informants for further validation of the findings during the document analysis and focus group discussions. Also requested were representatives from the persons under custody (PUC) to be selected by the PNP CSU that would form part of the stakeholders to be interviewed by the researchers. A separate request was given to the PNP Logistics Support Service pertaining to the issuance of equipment to the PNP CSU, including its maintenance and the prioritization of vehicles when needed by the PNP CSU.

The request was approved for the interview of all Staff Officers of HSS and LSS, except for the interview of PUC, and the leadership of HSS informed the researchers that they could only interview the PUCs when there is a court order.



KII was conducted to the PNP CSU personnel, staff officers of HSS and LSS on April 10 and 11, 2017.

On April 11, 2017, the Researchers sought the assistance of the Court of Administrator of the Supreme Court to allow the researchers to interview the PUCs as it seems highly impracticable to seek leave of court from the multitudinal courts of jurisdictions to the plenty of cases against all the PUCs; however, the request was not immediately acted upon because unfortunately, the Honorable Court Administrator, Atty Jose Midas P. Marquez was then on an official mission abroad and the lawyers assigned to the PNP were also out of town. Researchers were only told to be informed through text message as to any update pertaining to the request. Until May 3, 2017, the request remains undecided with the Office of the Court Administrator. In anticipation, however, of the possible delay or even denial of said request, detectives were employed by the researchers to locate PUCs of the PNP CSU, who was recently released from its custody. Locating five of them namely Joselito De Guzman, Rodel Talento, John Paolo Carracedo, Rex Ariel Diongon, and Edward Oronan, who were all former members of the PNP, a focus group discussion was conducted with them on April 28, 2017, at a place where a majority of them requested not to be disclosed for security reasons. Another reason why the researchers invested extra efforts in locating individuals who were already released from CSU custody is the fact that these individuals already regained their freedom and liberty; hence they could already talk freely for or against PNP CSU on matters relevant to our study.

There were three (3) sources of data such as the results of the interview, summaries of the focus group discussions and the documents analyzed, applying triangulation which was described by Patton (1999) as referring to the use of multiple methods of data sources to develop a comprehensive understanding of phenomena.

Framework of Analysis

The systems model or the so-called Input-Process-Output-Outcome model was used as a framework of analysis of this study. The inputs in the analysis framework included the assessment of the respondents on the different aspects of the PNP CSU, such as its strategy, structure, shared values, systems, style of leadership, staff, and skills. Different methods were used, such as documentary analysis, KII and FGD. The expected outputs are the



standards to ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities. The outcome will be a higher level of security on the part of the PUC, the PNP CSU personnel, and the community.




Figure 2. Framework of Analysis

III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Document Analysis

On Strategy. The PNP CSU has in-place security plans for on-campus security, mainly covering the day-to-day operations and security procedures being implemented in its facility as specified in the HSS Manual of Operations. PNP CSU, likewise, has security plans for specific contingencies like a riot, hostage-taking, fire/conflagration, and earthquake. For movements of PUCs outside PNP CSU facility, like court hearings, etc., a separate security plan is being crafted per activity. Concerning equipment, the PNP CSU equipment inventory



report has a long list. However, concerning move, shoot, and communicate equipment, Table 2 below specifies the figures on these.

Table 2. Move, Shoot and Communicate Equipment

CLASSIFICATION (Quantity Withheld)
Mobility
Prison Van
Firepower
M16 Rifle Cal 5.56
Magazine for M16 Rifle (Long)
Magazine for M16 Rifle (Short)
Ammo for M16 Rifle
M14 Rifle Cal 7.62
Magazine for M14 Rifle (Short)
Ammo for M14 Rifle
Shotgun
Ammo for Shotgun
Pistol 9mm
CLASSIFICATION(Quantity Withheld)
Communication
Handheld Radio
Telephone
Cellular Phone

Source: Inventory Report of PNP CSU Equipment as of November 2016

Concerning personnel, as of February 2017, the PNP CSU has fifty-seven (57) personnel in all, as shown in Table 3 below. Still, the approved staffing pattern is giving PNP CSU with 186 personnel authorized strength, as stated in DPL-10-02 dated April 29, 2010. The ideal maximum PUCs is 88, as determined by PNP CSU based on international standard about its area.



Table 3. Disposition of PNP CSU Personnel

Classification	Frequency	Percentage
Police Commissioned Officers	4	7.02
Office Personnel (1 office personnel- schooling)	13	22.81
Sergeants of the Guard	4	7.02
Perimeter Guards (4 teams of five guards each, except the last team with only four members)	19	33.33
Security and Escort Personnel (3 teams with four members each, with 1 Escort Supervisor)	13	22.81
Tower Guards (Four (4) one-man shifts)	4	7.02
Total	57	100.00

Source: PNP CSU – Disposition of Personnel as of February 2017

On Structure. To identify the command line, the PNP CSU has an organizational structure that it is also using for the manning or designation of its personnel.

On Systems. Concerning the processes and procedures in the day-to-day operations of the PNP CSU, the HSS Manual of Operations and the security plans have the specifics for both on-camp and off-camp security operations. Among others, the said manual prescribes procedures for visitors and package control, visiting time, sunning time for PUCs, etc. Complementary to it are the security plans which specifies to the roles of the concerned personnel of the PNP CSU, including incidents of fire, riot, and earthquake, and escorting and security PUCs outside of PNP CSU facility. Concerning the availability of equipment, the PNP CSU inventory report specifies which sections/offices or who among its personnel are using the particular equipment or who is in-charge thereon. Except for short firearms, which are issued to individual personnel, most of the other equipment is not issued to individual personnel. Vehicles, other equipment, and personnel augmentation are had on the strength of the request that PNP CSU is sending to HSS. The D, HSS signs request for personnel,



vehicle and other equipment augmentation from other services/groups of the PNP like the Logistics Support Service, Communication and Electronics Service, Highway Patrol Group, Intelligence Group, and the local police through the concerned Directors or Regional Directors especially for movements of PUCs outside PNP CSU facility.

On Shared Values. To serve as guidance for decision-making and organizational action ethical direction, the PNP CSU has identified shared values in its performance governance system as Attitude, Teamwork, Dedication, and Skills.

On Style of Leadership. There exists no document showing the style of leadership being observed by the PNP CSU leaders.

On Staff. Concerning staff, PNP CSU is following the staffing prescribed in the NHQ PNP General Orders No. DPL 01-02 dated April 29, 2010 staffing pattern. Thus, it is outstretching its current 57 personnel to occupy highly critical positions prescribed under the said staffing pattern, which ideally should be manned by 186 personnel. On the other hand, considering that the PNP CSU is deploying personnel for official duty 24/7 and even at an irregular time for movements of PUC outside PNP CSU facility, it is maintaining barracks where its personnel could have some rest and regain strength.

On Skills. Based on its training profile, only a few PNP CSU personnel have relevant trainings in handling high-risk personalities or custodial functions as of February 2017.

Results of the Focus Group Discussion

There were two (2) focus group discussions conducted, which were very instrumental in ascertaining the issues, concerns, and problems in the PNP CSU. The first FGD was with PNP CSU personnel, while the second was with the five individuals who were former PUCs of the PNP CSU but already released from PNP custody. The areas assessed were adopted from the framework of McKinsey's 7S. However, as regards the first group, some participants gave multiple answers, and in some categories of the 7S, they left them blank. That is the reason why the total frequency of issues is sometimes below eight, but it was considered majority when at least four respondents who answered in the affirmative.



The second group, on the other hand, was unanimous in the issues raised by affirming the concerns voiced out by each other. Concerning the first group, the following were their concerns:

Strategy. Table 4 below shows the issues affecting the strategy of the PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities. These issues were deemed to be hampering the attainment of the vision and objectives of the PNP CSU through the performance of its mission. All the participants were unanimous in affirming all these issues of denial of requests for the provision of additional personnel and equipment, inconsistency in security plans strict implementation and the lack of regular review, rehearsal and implementation monitoring mechanism of security plans.

Table 4. Issues Affecting the STRATEGY of the PNP CSU in Handling High-Risk Personalities

Issues	Frequency	Percentage
Requests for provision of additional personnel were denied	8	25.00%
Requests for equipment procurement were often not granted & PNP CSU has no approved TEA	8	25.00%
Security plans may have been strictly implemented but not all the time	8	25.00%
No regular review, rehearsal, and implementation monitoring mechanism of security plans	8	25.00%
Total	32	100.00%

Structure. Table 5 below shows the issues affecting the structure of the PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities. Structure refers to the organizational structure and the reporting system or who reports to whom. The concerns voiced out about the structure of the PNP CSU are its personnel are being deployed for non-CSU tasks despite its lack of personnel, and issues addressed to other HSS offices are passed on to PNP CSU with the frequency of eight (8) and five (5), respectively.

Table 5. Issues Affecting the STRUCTURE of the PNP CSU in Handling High-Risk Personalities



Issues	Frequency	Percentage
Issues addressed to other HSS offices are passed on to PNP CSU	5	38.46%
CSU personnel are being deployed for non-CSU tasks despite its lack of personnel	8	61.54%
Total	13	100%

Systems. Table 6 below shows the issues affecting the systems of the PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities. The systems refer to daily activities, security procedures, equipment, and facilities. The main concerns under systems are equipment unavailability, and hesitation of PNP CSU personnel to conduct cell search with the highest frequency of eight (8); this was followed by no faithful compliance on the submission of after activity reports incorporating lessons learned after each activity with the frequency of seven (7); lack of a mechanism to ensure regular maintenance of equipment, and existing minimum ratio of escort of 1:1+1 to PUC during court hearings and similar activities involving the latter outside PNP CSU facility is oftentimes insufficient both with the frequency of six (6); and the least is that there is no regular security plans rehearsal, and implementation monitoring with a frequency of five (5).

Table 6. Issues Affecting the SYSTEMS of the PNP CSU in Handling High-risk Personalities

Issues	Frequency	Percentage
Equipment unavailability	8	20.00%
Lack of mechanism to ensure regular maintenance of equipment	6	15.00%
Hesitation of CSU personnel to conduct cell search	8	20.00%
No regular security plans rehearsal, and implementation monitoring	5	12.50%
Existing minimum ratio of escort of 1:1+1 to PUC during court hearings and similar activities involving the latter outside CSU facility is oftentimes insufficient	6	15.00%
No faithful compliance on the submission of after activity reports incorporating lessons learned after each activity	7	17.50%
Total	40	100.00%



Shared Values. Table 7 below shows the issues affecting the shared values of the PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities. The shared values refer to the core values, organizational culture and work ethics. The FGD participants answered that there are some issues among them regarding duty shifts, with a frequency of four (4) or 100% of the total frequency of issue.

Table 7. Issues Affecting the SHARED VALUES of the PNP CSU in Handling High-risk Personalities

Issues	Frequency	Percentage
Small issues regarding duty shifts	4	100.00%
Total	4	100.00%

Style of Leadership. Table 8 below shows the issues affecting the style of leadership of the PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities. The only issue raised by all the respondents in the style of leadership is that all suggestions of teams need to be considered with the frequency of eight (8).

Table 8. Issues Affecting the STYLE of Leadership of the PNP CSU in Handling High-risk Personalities

Issues	Frequency	Percentage
Suggestions of teams need to be considered	8	100.00%
Total	8	100.00%

Staff. Table 9 below shows the issues affecting the staff of the PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities. Staff refers to the PNP CSU personnel and their needs. The major staff issues are insufficient number of personnel that may be assigned to the different positions in the unit, personnel are not included in combat duty pay beneficiaries, barracks are likewise being used by PNP personnel of other units/offices with a frequency of eight (8), and some CSU personnel are not designated on their areas of expertise with a frequency of five (5).



Table 9. Issues Affecting the STAFF of the PNP CSU in Handling High-Risk Personalities

Issues	Frequency	Percentage
Some CSU personnel are not designated on their areas of expertise	5	17.24%
Insufficient number of personnel that may be assigned to the different positions in CSU	8	27.58%
CSU personnel are not included in combat duty pay beneficiaries	8	27.58%
Barracks are likewise being used by PNP personnel of other units/offices	8	27.58%
Total	29	100.00%

Skills. Table 10 below shows the issues affecting the staff of the PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities. All respondents' main issue regarding skills is that not all personnel have skills or competency trainings and lack of programs for continuing trainings and education relevant to handling high-risk personalities.

Table 10. Issues Affecting the SKILLS of the PNP CSU in Handling High- Risk Personalities

Issues	Frequency	Percentage
Not all personnel have skills or competency trainings and lack of programs for continuing trainings and education relevant to handling high-risk personalities	8	100.00%
Total	8	100.00%

As regards the second group, the concerns they raised were on the inadequacy and unserviceability of the PNP CSU vehicle. One of the discussants-respondents stated that the only motor vehicle that was used encountered a serious engine problem along a busy boulevard. The persons deprived of liberty were required to push the said vehicle. This findings is critical concerning the security and safety of the authorities and the PDL themselves.

Results of KII

The key informants' interview aimed to ascertain the ideas of the PNP CSU regarding



the standards that need to be established to ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities. The measures, which also followed the parameters set under the McKinsey 7S model, prescribe only the minimum requirement per element. While the document analysis, as well as the focus group discussions, were done in a more general manner, the KII delved already with the inevitable details of the issues and recommendations that cropped up during the document analysis and were floated during the FGD.

Strategy. Tables 11 and 12 below show the proposed standards to ensure a highly effective and efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in handling high-risk personalities in terms of vehicles, firearms, communications, other equipment, and security plans.

Vehicles, firearms, communications, and other equipment. Table 11 below shows the proposed standards to ensure a highly effective and efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in handling high-risk personalities in terms of vehicles, firearms, communications, and other equipment. Those included in the list pertain to the proposals of the respondents that obtained 100% approval or majority count. As seen in the Appendix, some of the equipment are not included because they obtained zero votes or less than the majority.

Table 11. Standards to Ensure a Highly Effective and Efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in Handling High-risk Personalities in terms of Vehicles, Firearms Communication, and Other Equipment

Description	STANDARDS
Vehicles	Prison Van with a seating capacity of 14-17 persons (3 units), Utility Patrol/Passenger Jeep with a seating capacity of 14-17 persons (1 unit), Coaster/Bus with a seating capacity of 25-30 persons (1 unit), Back to Back Type with a seating capacity of 14-17 persons (1 unit), and a Standard Motorcycle (1 unit)
Firearms	Pistol 9MM (86 pcs); Rifle 5.56 (M16) (43 pcs), Magazine for M16 Rifle Long (258 pcs), and Magazine for M16 Rifle Short



	(43 pcs)
Rappelling Equipment	Rappel Rope (2pcs), Tactical Harness (2pcs), Fast Rope (2pcs), Carabiner/Snap Links (2 pcs), Ultra Ascender (2 pcs) and Rescue Pulley (2 pcs)
Search and Rescue Equipment	Medicine kit (1 pc), Personal Rescue Kit (1 pc), Stretcher, Portable Generator Set (1 pc), Search and Rescue Kit (1 pc), Light Jack Hammer (1 pc), Fire Axe (3 pcs), and Battering Ram (1 pc)
Other Military, Police, and Security Equipment	Bulletproof Vest (26 pcs), and Bandolier (43 pcs)
Intelligence Equipment	GPS Monitoring and Tracking Device (3 pcs), Vehicle Monitoring and Tracker System (3 pcs), Thermal Imager (1 unit), and Radio Direction Finder (1 pc)
Communication Equipment	Handheld Radio (38 pcs), Base Radio (1 pc), Spare Battery Packs (38 pcs), Telephone – Direct line (1 pc), Telephone- Local (3 pcs), Telephone-Intercom (5 pcs), Internet connection (1 line), and Public Address System (2 pcs,)
Other Equipment	Digital Camera (2 pcs), Videocam (1 pc), Voice Recorder (1 pc), CCTV Camera System (1 pc), and Generator Power House (1 pc)
Furniture and fixtures	Senior Executive Chair (1 pc), Clerical Chairs (25 pcs), Junior Executive Tables (5 pcs), Clerical Tables (1 pc), Armrack (4pcs), Steel Cabinet (2 pcs), Book Shelves (1 pc), and Double Deck Beds (22 pcs)
Information and communication technology equipment	Computer Desktops (9 units), Laptop (1 unit), All-in-one Inkjet Printer (1 pc), Routers (Wired and wireless) (1 pc), and UPS/AVR (9 units),
Library books	Basic Police Report Writing (2 pcs), Children Welfare and the Law (1 pc), Comprehensive Criminal Inves Procedure (2 pcs), Criminal Investigation of Drug Offenses (1 pc), Criminal Management (1 pc), and Police Community Relations (1 pc)
Disaster Response & Rescue Equipment	Fire Alarm Control Panel (3 pcs) and Fire Extinguisher 20 lbs (5 pcs),
Control equipment	Handheld Metal Detector (3 pcs) and X-ray Baggage (1 pc)
CDM Equipment	Anti-Riot Helmet (8 pcs), Anti-Riot Shield (8 pcs), Hand & Body Protector (8 pcs), Gas Mask (8 pcs), and Truncheon (8 pcs)

Security Plans. The standards for strategy or for attaining the vision and objectives of the PNP CSU through the performance of its mission were categorized into on-camp security and off-camp security. For on-camp security, 100% of the respondents agreed on regular custodial facility security plan review and implementation and ensuring personnel



sufficiency. There were 34 or 97.14% who agreed on ensuring equipment sufficiency and ready availability, and regular review, rehearsal, and implementation of contingency plans such as PNP CSU Defense Plan, Fire Plan, Anti-riot Plan, and Anti-Earthquake Plan. For the off-camp security procedures, all the respondents (100%) agreed to the formulation and strict implementation of security plan per activity/movement of PUC outside PNP CSU facility, which includes court hearings and other activities, and collaboration with friendly forces.

Table 12. Standards to Ensure a Highly Effective and Efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in Handling High-Risk Personalities in terms of Security Plans

Standards	Agree		Disagree	
	F	%	F	%
A. On-Camp Security				
Regular custodial facility security plan review and implementation	35	100.00	0	0.00
Ensure personnel sufficiency	35	100.00	0	0.00
Ensure equipment sufficiency and ready availability	34	97.14	1	2.86
Regular review, rehearsal, and implementation of contingency plans:				
- PNP CSU Defense Plan	34	97.14	1	2.86
- Fire Plan	34	97.14	1	2.86
- Anti-riot Plan	34	97.14	1	2.86
- Anti-Earthquake Plan	34	97.14	1	2.86
B. Off-Camp Security				
Formulation and strict implementation of security plan per activity/movement of PUC outside PNP CSU facility, which includes court hearings and other activities	35	100.00	0	0.00
Collaboration with friendly forces	35	100.00	0	0.00



Structure. Table 13 below shows the proposed standards to ensure a highly effective and efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in handling high-risk personalities in terms of structure. Structure refers to the way the organization is

Standards	Agree		Disagree	
	F	%	F	%
Direct and clear organizational structure (duties, functions, reporting system)	35	100.00	0	0.00
Close supervision of higher offices that has direct operational control over the PNP CSU	35	100.00	0	0.00
PNP CSU personnel may be detailed/ utilized to the following: As parade personnel during command activities like:				
- Flag raising/ lowering	7	20.00	28	80.00
- PNP Day	7	20.00	28	80.00
- Retirement/ arrival/ departure honors	7	20.00	28	80.00
- Saturday inspections	33	94.29	2	5.71
- Lights and Water conservation	0	0.00	35	100.00
- Task Force Diciplina	0	0.00	35	100.00
Quick resolution of issues and concerns within PNP CSU	35	100.00	0	0.00

structured, who reports to whom to ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities. The standards proposed by the respondents include direct and clear organizational structure (duties, functions, reporting system), Close supervision of higher offices that have direct operational control over the PNP CSU, and quick resolution of issues and concerns within PNP CSU. These three indicators obtained 100% agreement. Thirty-three (33) or 94.29 percent agreed that PNP CSU personnel might be detailed for Saturday inspections. However, the majority or from 80-percent to 100-percent of them disagreed with being detailed in lights and water conservation, Task Force Diciplina, flag raising/ lowering, PNP Day, and retirement/ arrival/ departure honors.



Table 13. Standards to Ensure a Highly Effective and Efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in Handling High-Risk Personalities in terms of Structure

Systems. Tables 14 and 15 below show the proposed standards to ensure a highly effective and efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in handling high-risk personalities in terms of the following systems:

Armory and Supply Room. Table 14 below shows the proposed standards to ensure a highly effective and efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in handling high-risk personalities in terms of armory and supply room. The question was asked because, at present, there is a need for an armory for the PNP CSU and to have an improved supply room. All the respondents agreed that PNP CSU must have an armory and supply room.

Table 14. Standards to Ensure a Highly Effective and Efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in Handling High-Risk Personalities in terms of Armory and Supply Room

	Agree		Disagree	
	F	%	F	%
Armory and supply room				
To ensure effective and efficient PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities, is there a need to establish a new armory and supply room in the PNP CSU?	35	100.00	0	0.00

Security Procedures. Table 15 shows the proposed standards to ensure a highly effective and efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in handling high-risk personalities in terms of security procedures. Security procedures are categorized into on-camp security and off-camp security. For on-camp security, all the respondents agreed (100%) to the following: regular but random cell search and PUC inspection; safety, security, and, guarding system; visitors control and inspection; contraband inspection; regular security survey and inspection with 100% compliance; and formulation of contingency plans such as Camp Defense Plan, Fire Plan, and Anti-riot Plan and Anti-Earthquake Plan. For off-



camp security, the respondents had a 100-percent agreement on Security Plan formulation for each court hearings and other PUC movements/ activities outside PNP CSU facility; a rehearsal of security plan implementation per activity/movement of PUC outside PNP CSU facility; evaluation/critique; implementation of security plan per activity/movement of PUC outside PNP CSU facility; and formulation and submission of after activity reports incorporating lessons learned and further improvement. On the standard number of escorts of PUC outside the PNP CSU facility, 25 or 71.43% agreed to 150%.

Table 15. Standards to Ensure a Highly Effective and Efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in Handling High-Risk Personalities in terms of Security Procedures

Security Procedures	Agree		Disagree	
	F	%	F	%
A. On-camp security				
Regular custodial facility security				
• Regular but random cell search and PUC inspection	35	100.00	0	0.00
• PUC security, safety, and control (Strict implementation of PNP CSU rules and regulations regarding:				
❖ Safety, security, and guarding system	35	100.00	0	0.00
❖ Visitors control and inspection	35	100.00	0	0.00
❖ Contraband inspection	35	100.00	0	0.00
❖ Regular security survey and inspection with 100% compliance	35	100.00	0	0.00
Formulation of contingency plans:				
• Camp Defense Plan	35	100.00	0	0.00
• Fire Plan	35	100.00	0	0.00
• Anti-riot Plan	35	100.00	0	0.00
• Anti-Earthquake Plan	35	100.00	0	0.00
B. Off-camp Security				
Security Plan formulation for each court hearings and other PUC movements/ activities outside PNP CSU facility	35	100.00	0	0.00



Rehearsal of security plan implementation per activity/ movement of PUC outside PNP CSU facility	35	100.00	0	0.00
Evaluation/critique	35	100.00	0	0.00
Implementation of security plan per activity/movement of PUC outside PNP CSU facility	35	100.00	0	0.00
Formulation and submission of after activity reports incorporating lessons learned & further improvement	35	100.00	0	0.00

For movements of PUC outside of CSU facility-

Percentage of PNP CSU escort personnel to PUC (PNP CSU Escort Personnel: PUC)

150%	25	71.43%
175%	9	25.71%
200%	1	2.86%

Shared Values. Table 16 below shows the proposed standards to ensure a highly effective and efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in handling high-risk personalities in terms of shared values. The assessed shared values or the core values, organizational culture and work ethics to ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities included pro-God, pro-country, pro-people, pro-environment, good attitude, harmony, and accountability. The 35 respondents or 100-percent have all agreed that these are ideal values that must be shared within the PNP CSU.

Table 16. Standards to Ensure a Highly Effective and Efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in Handling High-Risk Personalities in terms of Shared Values

Question	Shared values
To ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities, do you support the following proposed standard core values?	All 35 respondents answered YES to: Pro-God Pro-country Pro-people Pro-environment Good attitude Harmony Accountability

Style of Leadership. Table 17 below shows the proposed standards to ensure a highly effective and efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in handling



high-risk personalities in terms of leadership styles. The personnel of the PNP CSU prefer a democratic leader with a total of thirty-five (35) or 100 % “YES” votes. Thirty-four (34) or 97.14% “YES” votes were obtained by the leadership styles transformational, team, and charismatic. The leadership styles, which include strategic, cross-cultural, facilitative, coaching, and visionary, received thirty-four (34) or 94.29% “YES” votes. Bridging leadership obtained thirty-two (32) or 91.43% “YES” votes. Transactional leadership gained only eighteen (18) or 51.43% “YES” votes. Autocratic leadership for PNP CSU is often not desired as twenty-nine (29) or 82.86% answered “NO” for it.

Table 17. Standards to Ensure a Highly Effective and Efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in Handling High-Risk Personalities in terms of Style of Leadership

Style of Leadership	Yes		No	
	F	%	F	%
Autocratic Leadership	6	17.14%	29	82.86%
Democratic Leadership	35	100.00%	0	0.00%
Strategic Leadership	33	94.29%	2	5.71%
Transformational Leadership	34	97.14%	1	2.86%
Team Leadership	34	97.14%	1	2.86%
Cross-cultural Leadership	33	94.29%	2	5.71%
Facilitative Leadership	33	94.29%	2	5.71%
Laissez-faire Leadership	20	57.14%	15	42.86%
Transactional Leadership	18	51.43%	17	48.57%
Coaching Leadership	33	94.29%	2	5.71%
Charismatic Leadership	34	97.14%	1	2.86%
Visionary Leadership	33	94.29%	2	5.71%
Bridging Leadership	32	91.43%	3	8.57%

Staff. Tables 18, 19, and 20 below show the proposed standards to ensure a highly



effective and efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in handling high-risk personalities in terms of staff.

Personnel Sufficiency. Table 18 below shows the proposed standards to ensure a highly effective and efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in handling high-risk personalities in terms of personnel sufficiency. For the staff or personnel of the PNP CSU to be sufficient, three options were given. Among the choices, the ideal number of personnel is 88 or 100% of the maximum capacity of the PNP CSU as twenty- three (23) or 65.71% approved this. There were 10 or 28.57% who proposed 150% fill up, and 2 answered 186.

Table 18. Standards to Ensure a Highly Effective and Efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in Handling High-risk Personalities in terms of Personnel Sufficiency

Personnel Sufficiency	Yes	
	F	%
100% fill-up of staffing pattern (186 personnel)	2	5.71%
Maximum PUC capacity (88 PUCs) of PNP CSU facility (Number equivalent to 150% of maximum capacity or 132)	10	28.57%
A number equivalent to 100% of maximum capacity or 88	23	65.71%

Minimum Number of PNP CSU Personnel. Table 19 below shows the proposed standards to ensure a highly effective and efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in handling high-risk personalities in terms of a proposed minimum number of PNP CSU personnel. The only category that reached the minimum number is the Sergeants of the Guard with four current, and four proposed. All the other categories had a negative variance. The respondents answered that 23 more security and escort personnel are needed. The KII also revealed that the PNP CSU personnel wanted more one additional PCO, seven more office personnel, four more perimeter guards, and six more tower guards.



Table 19. Standards to Ensure a Highly Effective and Efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in Handling High-Risk Personalities in terms of Minimum Number of PNP CSU Personnel

POSITION / DESIGNATION	Current Number PNP CSU Personnel	Proposed Minimum of Number of PNPCSU Personnel	Variance
Police Commissioned Officers	4	5	-1
Office Personnel	13	20	-7
Sergeants of the Guard	4	4	0
Perimeter Guards	19	23	-4
Security and Escort Personnel	13	26	-13
Tower Guards	4	10	-6

Staff Provisions. Table 20 below shows the proposed standards to ensure a highly effective and efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in handling high-risk personalities in terms of staff provisions. Results showed that the respondents agreed with 100-percent on the inclusion of PNP CSU personnel among those entitled to “combat duty pay” and conduct of personnel information and continuing education (PICE). There were 20 or 57.14% of the respondents who approved of barracks maintenance exclusively for PNP CSU personnel with minimum capacity for 50% of PNP CSU. The provision of additional allowance for the risky tasks was approved by only 48.57% of the respondents.



Table 20. Standards to Ensure a Highly Effective and Efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in Handling High-Risk Personalities in terms of Staff Provisions

Staff Provisions	Answers	
	F	%
Inclusion of PNP CSU personnel among those entitled to “combat duty pay”	35	100.00%
Provision of additional allowance for the risky tasks:		
“YES” answer	17	48.57%
“NO” answer	18	51.43%
Barracks maintenance exclusively for PNP CSU personnel with minimum capacity for:		
75% of PNP CSU	15	42.86%
50% of PNP CSU	20	57.14%
Conduct of personnel information and continuing education	35	100.00%

Skills. Table 21 below shows the proposed standards to ensure a highly effective and efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in handling high-risk personalities in terms of skills. All or 100% of the respondents agreed that PNP CSU must-have skills or competencies in handling high-risk or high-value personalities, particularly in: handling emergency situations, first aiding, proficiency in handling long and short firearms, sniffing, martial arts and self-defense, hostage negotiation, and driving.

Table 21. Standards to Ensure a Highly Effective and Efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in Handling High-risk Personalities in terms of Skills

Skills
Personnel must have skills/ competencies on:
All 35 respondents answered “YES” to the following:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Handling high-risk and high profile persons; • Handling emergencies; • First aiding; • Proficiency in handling long and short firearms;



-
- Sniffing;
 - Martial arts and self-defense;
 - Hostage negotiation; and
 - Driving
-

ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STATE

Strategy. On strategy, equipment and personnel augmentation from other PNP units/offices are necessary even in the performance of routine PNP CSU functions of transporting PUCs to and from the hearings in courts or the Department of Justice (DOJ). This is so because, with respect to personnel, PNP CSU staffing pattern is not yet fully filled up due to lack of PNP personnel for varying reasons including insufficient quota allocation due to budgetary constraint, the quota is not fully filled up for lack of qualified applicants, and PNP leadership move in downloading personnel from police headquarters to the field, which likewise affect the PNP CSU. Said similar necessity for augmentation of equipment from other PNP units/offices also happens simply because the need for certain equipment like vehicles, radios, and firearms are actual. Still, PNP CSU has not enough on these. There is likewise no approved Table of Equipment and Allowance (TEA), yet for PNP CSU, hence there is no basis more solidly justifying the procurement and issuance of the equipment requested by PNP CSU. TEA is regarded as a more solid basis for equipment procurement because it is the document prescribed in identifying the equipment needs of a particular unit in the PNP, which after processing and justification, is being reviewed and approved by the National Police Commission. Table 11 above shows the specific equipment identified by the respondents as a minimum in ensuring the highly effective and efficient PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities and the most pressing concern of PNP CSU on equipment is on vehicles since its lone custodial van is really not enough and PNP CSU is oftentimes borrowing vehicles from HSS and LSS in the performance of its routine function of escorting PUCs to attend hearings in court, DOJ, and similar bodies, and even in transporting PUCs to and from hospitals. On this, it has to be noted that the health condition of PUCs might require swift transportation to hospitals and nobody could tell that no two or more PUCs may require it during holy hours of the night of a lengthy holidays where only a few people are available in Camp Crame, or during the busiest working hours where all vehicle in Camp Crame including ambulances are already used for equally urgent situations.



Availability, therefore, of additional vehicles to PNP CSU is indirectly determinative in time of the death or survival of sick PUCs. On this note, former Patrolman and PUC Rizal Ali were pronounced dead on arrival at the PNP General Hospital (PNPGH), and there was no vehicle used in transporting him from PNP CSU to the PNPGH. The history might have been different if the PNP CSU then had a vehicle to transport him from PNP CSU to the hospital.

Concerning security, on-camp security plans (including contingency plans) are in place, but there is no regular review, rehearsal and no monitoring mechanism, cell search however is being conducted regularly; regarding off-camp security, security plans are being made as a matter of practice per movement of PUC outside PNP CSU facility; but in both on-camp and off-camp, security plans may have been strictly implemented but not all the time;

Structure. About structure, the PNP CSU is under the functional supervision of the Intelligence and Investigation Division (IID) of HSS. The PNP CSU is headed by the Chief, CSU, who has a deputy. Down the line are the two sections of Administrative and Security and Escort Sections, which are headed by the respective Section Chiefs. The Security and Escort Section is composed of Teams headed by Team Leaders. At present, it has 57 personnel when it has 186 authorized personnel strength.

On the other hand, PNP CSU personnel are also being deployed for non-CSU tasks despite its insufficiency of personnel, causing a further burden on them. Also, some PNP CSU personnel are finding it more efficient if the concerns which are already addressed to and may rightfully and competently be acted upon by the Intelligence and Investigation Division, HSS are actually acted upon outright by that Division without referring or passed them on to PNP CSU. On this, further details were refused by CSU personnel as they could already lead to the identification of the personnel involved who might be put in consequential jeopardy.

Systems. Concerning systems, equipment that are often used by personnel are issued individually to ensure ready availability for use, and those that are used on the situation-need basis are retained in the supply room of the PNP CSU and only issued as the need arises; due to insufficiency, additional vehicles and other equipment like radios and firearms are requested from HSS, CES and LSS very often since the PNP CSU only has one vehicle, a custodial van primarily to transport PUCs, radios are also inadequate so with long firearms;



and PNP CSU is not conducting regular rehearsals of security plans and implementation monitoring for movements outside PNP CSU facility. Equipment insufficiency is paralleled by personnel insufficiency, thus the need also of personnel augmentation from other PNP units/offices for escorting and securing PUCs for hearings in court and DOJ, and hospitalization. In these PUC movements outside the PNP CSU facility, *the minimum ratio of escort to PUC of 1:1+1* is being observed, and after activity reports are being submitted not only for recording purposes but also to support monitoring.

Shared Values. To ensure the smooth and vibrant functionality of every PNP CSU personnel, they already proclaimed their shared values via the so-called "performance governance system," which was localized in the PNP under the name "P.A.T.R.O.L. Plan 2030," as Attitude, Teamwork, Dedication, and Skills.

Style of Leadership. In ensuring that PNP CSU objectives are attained, its leadership also uses different leadership styles that befit the situation.

Staff. Regarding staff, limited number of personnel causes unfilled up positions or unmanned posts in PNP CSU; PNP CSU personnel, however, are generally capable of performing assigned PNP CSU tasks; barracks are likewise being used by PNP personnel of other units/offices; and PNP CSU being under HSS, which is an administrative support unit of the PNP, its personnel are not included in the combat duty pay beneficiaries.

Skills. Having emphasized skills as one of its core values, some of PNP CSU personnel already have skills in handling high-risk PUCs as developed through trainings including their trainings in custodial management and through experiences, but many of them do not possess similar skills yet, hence the need to develop further skills concerning handling of high-risk personalities.

Table 22 below shows the current state of the PNP CSU, as established through document analysis, focus group discussion, and key informant interview, in handling high-risk personalities.



Table 22. Current State of the Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in Handling High-Risk Personalities

Elements	Current State
Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Staffing pattern is not fully filled-up, and personnel augmentation from other PNP units/offices are often requested for the performance of routinary PNP CSU functions especially in escorting PUCs for court hearings and similar activities outside CSU facility;• No existing Table of Equipment and Allowance (TEA) as a more compelling basis for procurement or issuance of needed equipment in PNP CSU;• PNP CSU is likewise requesting a loan of a vehicle and other equipment from HSS, LSS, Communication, and Electronics Service (CES), and other PNP units/offices for the performance of routinary PNP CSU functions mainly in escorting PUCs for court hearings and similar activities outside PNP CSU facility due to inadequacy of this equipment in the latter unit; and• On-camp security plans (including contingency plans) are in place. On off-camp security, security plans are being made as a matter of practice per movement of PUC outside CSU facility.• PNP CSU personnel are being deployed for non-PNP CSU tasks despite its lack of personnel; and
Structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Some communications and other concerns already addressed to Intelligence and Investigation Division, HSS is not acted upon outright by that Division and still passed on to PNP CSU.• Equipment that is often used by personnel are issued individually to ensure ready availability for use;
Systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Additional vehicles and other equipment like radios and firearms are requested from HSS, CES, and LSS;• Equipment and personnel augmentation from other PNP units/offices;



- Security plan rehearsals are being done rarely, while implementation monitoring is done not intensively;
 - Cell search is being conducted regularly;
 - Ratio of escort to PUC of 1:1+1 during court hearings and similar activities involving the latter outside CSU facility is being observed; and
 - PNP CSU personnel are submitting after activity reports
- Shared Values
- PNP CSU personnel are observing the following core values: Attitude, Teamwork, Dedication, and Skills
- Style of Leadership
- PNP CSU leaders are observing different leadership styles that befit the situation
 - Unmanned posts;
 - Personnel are generally capable of performing assigned PNP CSU tasks;
- Staff
- An existing barracks is being shared by CSU personnel and PNP personnel from other units/offices; and
 - PNP CSU being under HSS, an administrative support unit of the PNP, its personnel are not included in the combat duty pay beneficiaries
- Skills
- Some PNP CSU personnel already have skills and training needed in handling high-risk personalities, but there are no programs for continuing trainings and education relevant to handling high-risk personalities
-

ISSUES AND CONCERNS

Upon discussing several aspects of the PNP CSU to the selected personnel in the Focus Group Discussion, several problems were emphasized. These were the lack of personnel, issues of other units passed on to the PNP CSU, lack of vehicles, issues regarding duty shifts, need for democratic leadership, multiple tasking of personnel, and lack of training.



These issues confront the PNP CSU daily. In establishing the standards for the institution, these must be addressed first. The most pressing problems were consistently the number of security and escort personnel and the number of vehicles to be used for transporting persons under custody (PUCs).

Strategy. The data showed that the main concerns of the PNP CSU in attaining its vision and objectives through the discharge of its mission or strategy – were on the enhancement of security plans and strict implementation given that security plans may have been strictly implemented, but not all the time, the want of regular review, rehearsal and implementation monitoring mechanism of security plans, the lack of personnel since CSU requests for additional personnel could not be granted due to multi-faceted reasons. In the same vein, PNP CSU requests for equipment procurement are oftentimes not granted, thus its lack of equipment. Inside Camp Crame, while it may seem that these concerns are inconsequential, the fact remains that Rizal Ali, a PUC was pronounced dead on arrival at the PNP General Hospital (PNPGH), also in Camp Crame.

The situation might have been different had CSU then have a vehicle that could have been used in transporting said PUC to PNPGH. The fact, however, remains that CSU remained armed with only one vehicle until this time. This, therefore, highlights the degree of importance of granting the longtime request of the additional vehicle to CSU. However, lack of equipment, including vehicles, has been the perennial problem in many government offices.

Structure. The "structure" refers to the organizational structure and the reporting system—who reports to whom. There were only two concerns. One concern pertains to tasking CSU personnel for non-CSU functions, thereby further taxing the already depleted number of CSU personnel. On the other hand, one FGD participant mentioned that "issues addressed to other units/offices are passed to PNP CSU." Explicitly, the participant stated that if an issue has already been addressed to Intelligence and Investigation Division (IID), HSS then that should already be acted thereon and should no longer be passed on to the PNP CSU. Further detailing, however, was refused to avoid possible prejudice, as it could already lead to the identification of personnel involved.



No other concern was raised under a structure. This may be due to the fact that the organizational structure of the PNP CSU is already fixed and may not need so much tinkering. The structure of the reporting system has already been established. As the saying goes, why fix something that is not broken?

Systems. “Systems” is the third of the hard S of the McKinsey 7-S model. In the PNP CSU, systems refer to the daily activities, security procedures, equipment, and facilities. The participants seemed to be eager and enthusiastic to voice out their concerns on these, as some have given more than one concern. The lack of vehicles has been consistently mentioned as hampering strategy and systems. This implied that any standardization of the PNP CSU has to at least start with acquiring vehicles, especially for the transport of the PUCs.

There were, however, problems that need to be addressed under the unavailability of equipment. PNP CSU lacks bulletproof vests. Since the biggest mission of the PNP CSU is to provide security to the PUCs and to its personnel, this problem on the lack of bulletproof vests seemed to be urgently calling for concrete and definitive action. This concern is most pronounced during the transport of PUCs. There will always be the probability of an ambush or rescue of the PUC from PNP CSU custody; hence, providing bulletproof vests will be a big necessity. Having mentioned equipment, the accompanying concern of lack of maintenance mechanism likewise arose to ensure equipment operational condition maintenance.

Other concerns were also mentioned, like the fact that PNP CSU has only one entry and exit point. However, this may not seem to be a big issue since this minimizes the weak security points of the facility. If one has to observe, it is the strength of the perimeter and partition walls that may concern the security personnel of the building. The participants also mentioned the concern on the slow procedure in transferring PUCs to regular jails. Still, this concern is quite benign compared to other interests of insufficient long firearms, lack of communication equipment and battery packs, the establishment of new armory and supply room, erasing hesitation in the conduct of cell search among PNP CSU personnel, strict



implementation of visitors control and inspection, and ensuring regular review and rehearsals of all contingency and security plans and their strict implementation and monitoring, which rather are of pressing concern that joins the level on the concern on vehicles for the transport of the PUCs and PNP CSU escort and security personnel. As far as hesitation of CSU personnel to conduct cell search is concerned, it appears quite understandable as many of the detainees were politicians, government officials, or CNN personalities, who might have thought that since they were only detainees as opposed against convicted prisoners, searching their belongings could have been a violation of their rights or status; thus fear for reprisal is predictable. Familiarity with the PUC also causes hesitation to conduct extensive cell search on the part of CSU personnel. Reluctance, however, was observed to be minimal based on observation and verification from the PNP CSU personnel. Relatedly, due to familiarity with the visitors and fear of reprisal from a high ranking government official, visitors and belongings searches are likewise relaxed, giving rise to airing this concern by FGD participants.

About the current minimum ratio of escort to PUC of 1:1+1 during court hearings and similar activities involving the latter outside CSU facility, it is often observed as being insufficient, given the security risk involved in transporting high profile/value PUCs.

After activity reports that are being submitted do not incorporate lessons learned, thus negating the opportunity of maximizing the benefits extractable from there towards improving similar future operations.

The concern raised during the second FGD regarding the old roofs of PNP CSU causing rainwater to penetrate through the ceiling, this matter may not be addressed here as it pertains to facilities which unfortunately not covered by this study as specified in the scope and limitation.

Shared Values. In terms of organizational culture, core values, and work ethics, the concern was merely on "small issues regarding duty shifts," which oftentimes refer only to willful tardiness in relieving outgoing duty personnel, habitual leaving of security posts with someone's buddy, and similar simple infractions of security policies and office regulations.



Style. There had been few concerns about leadership style in the PNP CSU. When the participants were being asked for comments, they were given definitions of leadership styles like democratic, bureaucratic, transformational, etc.

Their comment was, "suggestions of team members must be considered." The reason is that the procedures in the PNP CSU have already been established, so there was no need to reiterate them every day. In addition, since most of them have been in the unit for several years, the knowledge of the security personnel must be valuable inputs in the operation of the PNP CSU. However, during the KII, the democratic leadership style dominated the choice of the respondents with the affirmation of 35 or 100% of the respondents. But the autocratic leadership style also had six votes, or 17.14% of the respondents and the other leadership styles got affirmation ranging from 51.43% to 97.14. Hence, these prove that there exists no single leadership style that befits the peculiarities of the PNP CSU. Even autocratic leadership may be effective, especially in emergencies, where time is simply too precious for the leaders to decide and/or act.

Staff. The participants mentioned that an insufficient number of personnel that may be assigned to the different positions in PNP CSU is the main staff concern. This was highlighted by the concern aired during the second FGD by former PUCs of PNP CSU on the lack of guards particularly for the distant "Delta" building, when there is a sick PUC, especially during the night time or when raining since the guards in-charge were stationed at a far location, and the nearby tower post was unmanned, thereby diminishing the possibility to render medical assistance to a sick PUC. But, other concerns are also present like PNP CSU personnel are not included in combat duty pay beneficiaries since HSS is not operational but an administrative support service, although PNP CSU transport high-risk PUCs anywhere in the Philippines, thus posing serious risk against the life of PNP CSU escorting/securing personnel. Ambush and rescue by lawless elements, as already mentioned, are likely to happen; and that their barracks are likewise being used by PNP personnel of other units/offices.

Skills. In terms of skills, the primary concerns were lack of training and issues on the higher level capability of personnel to handle high-risk personnel. As the data show, there



are only fourteen (14) PNP CSU personnel that have training particularly relevant to handling high-risk personalities. Therefore, the remaining forty-three (43) of the total strength of PNP CSU need to have said training despite many of them have been in PNP CSU for many years; training would ensure that they know how to do things rightly. Experience might not guarantee similar assurance since it is not strange that what they have been accustomed to doing is not the right way of doing things. Training would ensure redirection into the right path.

Table 23 below shows the issues and concerns on ensuring a highly effective and efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in handling high-risk personalities.

Table 23. Issues and Concerns on Ensuring a Highly Effective and Efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in Handling High-Risk Personalities.

Variables	Issues and Concerns
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requests for provision of additional personnel were denied; • Requests for equipment procurement were often not granted;
Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security plans may have been strictly implemented but not all the time; and • No regular review, rehearsal, and implementation monitoring mechanism of security plans
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PNP CSU personnel are being deployed for non-PNP CSU tasks despite its lack of personnel; and
Structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communications and other concerns already addressed to Intelligence and Investigation Division, HSS is not acted upon outright by that Division but still passed on to PNP CSU.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Equipment unavailability;
Systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of mechanism to ensure regular maintenance of equipment;



-
- No regular security plans rehearsal, and implementation monitoring;
 - The hesitation of PNP CSU personnel to conduct cell search;
 - Not all visitors are thoroughly searched;
 - Existing minimum ratio of the escort of 1:1+1 to PUC during court hearings and similar activities involving the latter outside PNP CSU facility is often insufficient; and
 - No faithful compliance on the submission of after activity reports incorporating lessons learned after each activity

Shared Values

- Small issues regarding duty shifts

Style of
Leadership

- Suggestions of teams need to be considered

Staff

- Insufficient number of personnel that may be assigned to the different positions in PNP CSU;
- PNP CSU personnel are not included in combat duty pay beneficiaries; and
- Barracks are likewise being used by PNP personnel of other units/offices.

Skills

1. Not all personnel have skills or competency trainings and lack of programs for continuing trainings and education relevant to handling high-risk personalities

STANDARDS

The proposed standards to ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities initially were drawn from the document analysis and focus group discussions but principally were based on the answers and reflective of the thought processes of the personnel of the PNP CSU, and staff of HSS and LSS who were part of the key informants interview, as the latter method validated the findings established during the first two methodologies.



Strategy. The standards for strategy concerns are about ensuring personnel and equipment sufficiency and security within and without the facility. Personnel sufficiency, as a minimum, was a 1:1 ratio of CSU personnel to PUC based on the ideal custodial PUC capacity of 88. This means that PNP CSU personnel should proportionately be increased from 88 as PUC number go beyond PNP CSU maximum capacity. But CSU personnel number may not be reduced below 88 if we are to ensure the high effectiveness and efficiency of PNP CSU. In the same vein, PNP CSU has to be provided with the minimum equipment, including vehicles, as identified in the enclosed proposed Table of Equipment and Allowance (TEA) for the same purpose of ensuring its high effectiveness and efficiency. Concerning vehicle, the needed coaster also needs to be issued to CSU. This was the position of PSUPT HIPOLITO, the Acting Chief, Transportation, and Maintenance Division of the PNP Logistics Support Service, even though PNP CSU use of this particular vehicle may not be that frequent since PNP CSU has a smaller vehicle, a custodial van. This is to ensure that PNP CSU could use said vehicle once needed. Placing said vehicle under LSS would not give 100% assurance that PNP CSU could use it once requested by the latter unit. He further added that maintenance that cannot be done by PNP CSU may still be done by LSS even if said vehicle is issued to CSU. Coaster under usage may not be feared as LSS, or other PNP units/offices may still be allowed to use said vehicle when PNP CSU has no scheduled activity using the same.

The remaining proposed strategy is ensuring enhanced security, which should be done through semi-annual review and rehearsal of security plans; and strict implementation and monitoring. This covers both on-camp and off-camp security, which respectively refers to regular custodial facility security and on how the PUCs and the PNP CSU are secured during transport and court hearings, etc.

Structure. On the structure, respondents PNP CSU personnel proposed to be spared from deployment to non-PNP CSU function. On this, it may be noted that not all the time that PNP CSU personnel will be too busy and pressure in the performance of their functions. Yet, non-PNP CSU functions are also important PNP functions.



Systems. With respect to the system, the one proposed standard is to ensure the ready availability of sufficient equipment with a mechanism to ensure proper maintenance. This emphasizes the process of the availability of equipment for use as delay thereon is frowned upon in the face of the objective of PNP CSU effectiveness and efficiency. As a matter of course, maintenance is necessarily an accompanying element of equipment utilization. In the hope of helping in coming up with a standard for the PNP CSU, the respondents provided the "wish list" of equipment, which consolidated the particular equipment needed by PNP CSU but not yet in their possession. There is also a necessity for the amendment of the existing minimum ratio of an escort is 1:1+1 to PUC during court hearings and similar activities involving the latter outside PNP CSU facility to 150% as the minimum CSU escort personnel to PUC. The other standards are the conduct of security plan rehearsal, as may be necessary, and ensure strict implementation and monitoring per activity. The security plan rehearsal here is on top of the periodic rehearsal proposed under the strategy. Here, rehearsals about security plan for the movement of PUCs outside PNP CSU may be necessarily done especially for high-risk/value PUCs; while the strategy focuses more on on-campus security. Security plan strict implementation is a must in order to ensure that PNP CSU functions are carried out in the levels of high effectiveness and efficiency, hence no redo of escaping from PNP CSU custody like the escape of PUC SamerPalao in Cebu City while under custody of escorting PNP CSU personnel for a hearing before RTC Branch 10 on March 25, 2010.

Shared Values. Although shared values is not one of the hard elements of the McKinsey 7S framework, the personnel of the PNP CSU showed tremendous regard for values that need to be embraced by the PNP CSU personnel such as Pro-God, pro-country, pro-people, pro-environment, good attitude, harmony, and accountability.

Style of Leadership. This study also found out that PNP CSU leadership has been practicing varying leadership styles that fit the situation. However, the respondents emphasized that "suggestions of team members should be considered," thus a slight push for democratic leadership. This is understandable since the leaders (PCOs) stay only for a short period, whereas many of the staff have already more than ten years of service in the



PNP CSU. If the Chief, PNP CSU tap their thoughts and expertise, this would add to the morale of the personnel. On the same note, autocratic leadership is not so favored, with only six proponents out of 35. Still, this considerably small figure is truly reflective that authoritarian leadership likewise matters most, especially in emergencies where time is of the essence, and the urgency of decision and action is very much compulsive.

Staff. In terms of staff, fill-up all vacant authorized positions in accordance with the minimum number of PNP CSU personnel of 88 is one of the proposed standards. The reason is clear, the present CSU strength of 57 is really at a critical level, few more increase in the PUCs of PNP CSU especially the so-called high value or big personalities, the insufficiency of CSU personnel will be deeply felt; more so during movements out PNP CSU facility of PUCs. There is also a proposed standard for the inclusion of PNP CSU personnel among the beneficiaries of combat duty pay, given the risky nature of their job in escorting and securing high-risk personalities under its custody. The last proposed standard is to ensure the exclusive use by PNP CSU personnel of their barracks. Sharing barracks with PNP personnel of other units/offices causes discomfort to PNP CSU personnel since, for one, the security of their belongings is not clear. Another is the possibility of congestion in the barracks since other PNP personnel might take advantage of that situation.

Skills. To ensure continuing skills development to PNP CSU personnel, there is a need to program and implement relevant trainings to bolster the skills of PNP CSU personnel given that many of them still lack relevant training in handling high-risk personalities.

Table 24 below shows the proposed standard to ensure a highly effective and efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit (PNP CSU) in handling high-risk personalities.

Table 24. Standards to Ensure a Highly Effective and Efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in Handling High-Risk Personalities

Elements	Standard
Strategy	2. Ensure personnel sufficiency (minimum of 88 PNP CSU personnel);



3. Ensure equipment sufficiency (by providing PNP CSU with the minimum equipment identified in Table 11 and in the proposed TEA-Appendix A); and
4. Ensure enhanced security (through semi-annual review and rehearsal of security plans; and strict implementation and monitoring)

Structure

- PNP CSU personnel to be spared from deployment to non-CSU functions

Systems

- Ensure ready availability of sufficient equipment with mechanism to ensure proper maintenance;
- Amendment of the existing minimum ratio of the escort is 1:1+1 to PUC during court hearings and similar activities involving the latter outside PNP CSU facility to 150% as the minimum CSU escort personnel to PUC; and
- Conduct security plan rehearsal, as may be necessary; and ensure strict implementation and monitoring per activity

Shared Values

- Adherence to PNP Core Values, the right attitude, harmony, and accountability

Style of Leadership

- Sustain leadership style being practiced befitting the situation and giving due consideration to the suggestions of subordinates

Staff

- Fill-up all vacant authorized positions under the minimum number of PNP CSU personnel of 88;
- Include CSU personnel among the beneficiaries of Combat Duty Pay or equivalent benefits/allowances; and
- Ensure the exclusive use by PNP CSU personnel of their barracks

Skills

- Program and implement relevant trainings for continuing skills development to PNP CSU personnel

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

Just like in any changes or proposal for improvement, there may be reactions from certain groups. The following are the possible reactions and strategies to counter stakeholders' reactions. There are four (4) major stakeholders: the PNP CSU officers, the security and escort personnel and PNP CSU staff, the HSS officers, and PUCs.



Table 25. Stakeholder Analysis

Stakeholder	Reaction	Addressing Stakeholders' Reactions
PNP CSU Officers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Standardization may be viewed as extensive work that goes beyond their mandates. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> For the current PNP CSU officers, the establishment of the PNP CSU standards will be their legacy to the unit.
PNP CSU Escort and Security Personnel, and the staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Their participation may be limited due to their multiple tasks. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It must be emphasized that their inputs are valuable with their length of service and experience; Their time and efforts need to be allotted in the formulation of the PNP CSU standards; and Their works will be more productive with the established standards.
HSS Officers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Headquarters Support Service may view standardization as a deviation from established policies, thereby giving additional supervisory works for the unit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The administrative side will be more efficient & the operational side will be more effective due to the guidelines and standards already established
PUCs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PUCs may view setting-up of standards/standardization of PNP CSU as a welcome development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The safety and security of PUCs will be enhanced. Thus, further suggestions from their side are fertilized

Summary of Findings

This study assessed the different aspects of the PNP CSU as basis for the establishment of a standard to ensure it as being highly effective and efficient in handling high-risk personalities. It specifically sought answers to questions such as the current state of the PNP



CSU in handling high-risk personalities, the concerns that affect the PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities, and the standards that may be proposed to ensure a highly effective and efficient Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit in handling high-risk personalities. In answering these questions, documentary analysis and focus group discussions were initially used. The results therefrom were further validated through the conduct of key informant interviews. Under the McKinsey 7S model, PNP CSU respondents raised the following concerns:

On Strategy. The requests for provision of additional personnel were denied; requests for equipment procurement were often not granted; security plans may have been strictly implemented but not all the time; and there was no regular review, rehearsal and implementation monitoring mechanism of security plans.

On Structure. The PNP CSU personnel are being deployed for non-PNP CSU tasks despite its lack of personnel; and communications and other concerns already addressed to Intelligence and Investigation Division, HSS are not acted upon outright by that Division but still passed on to PNP CSU.

On Systems. It was found out that there is equipment unavailability; lack of mechanism to ensure regular maintenance of equipment; no regular security plans rehearsal, and implementation monitoring; hesitation of PNP CSU personnel to conduct cell search; not all visitors are thoroughly searched; existing minimum ratio of escort of 1:1+1 to PUC during court hearings and similar activities involving the latter outside CSU facility is oftentimes insufficient; and no faithful compliance on the submission of after activity reports incorporating lessons learned after each activity.

On Shared Values. There was small issues regarding duty shifts.

On Style of Leadership. The suggestions of teams need to be considered.

On Staff. The number of personnel that may be assigned to the different positions in PNP CSU is insufficient; PNP CSU personnel are not included in combat duty pay beneficiaries, and Barracks are likewise being used by PNP personnel of other units/offices

On Skills. Not all personnel have skills or competency trainings; and lack of programs for continuing trainings and education relevant to handling high-risk personalities



IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

Establishing a standard to ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU could indeed further level up the PNP CSU performance because this standard, which will serve as PNP CSU benchmark, was crafted, taking into consideration the special peculiarities of PNP CSU and it is geared to propel its high-quality performance. With the use of Mckinsey 7S model, however, in assessing PNP CSU, the entire result of findings and respondent's proposed standards on all the elements of the 7S have to be considered together as interdependence among the elements is an essence of this model and a change in one affects all others (mindtools.com); therefore, basing on the findings of the study, conclusions were actually drawn per element of the Mckinsey 7S model that in order to ensure the high effectiveness and efficiency of the PNP CSU, the following are needed:

On Strategy

- Ensure personnel sufficiency (minimum of 88 PNP CSU personnel);
- Ensure equipment sufficiency (by providing PNP CSU with the minimum equipment identified in the proposed (TEA-Appendix A); and
- Ensure enhanced security (through semi-annual review and rehearsal of security plans; and strict implementation and monitoring)

On Structure

- PNP CSU personnel' call to be spared from deployment to non-PNP CSU functions have to be considered

On Systems

- Ensure ready availability of sufficient equipment with a mechanism to ensure proper maintenance;
- Amendment of the existing minimum ratio of escort of 1:1+1 to PUC during court hearings and similar activities involving the latter outside PNP CSU facility to 150% as the minimum PNP CSU escort personnel to PUC; and



- Conduct security plan rehearsal, as may be necessary; and ensure strict implementation and monitoring per activity

On Shared values

- Adherence to PNP Core Values, good attitude, harmony, and accountability to guide the behavior and actions of PNP CSU personnel

On Style of Leadership

- Sustain leadership style being practiced by PNP CSU leadership befitting the peculiarities of the situation and giving due consideration to the suggestions of subordinates

On Staff

- Filling-up all of the vacant authorized positions following the minimum number of PNP CSU personnel of 88;
- Including PNP CSU personnel among the beneficiaries of Combat Duty Pay or equivalent benefits/allowances; and
- Ensuring the exclusive use by PNP CSU personnel of their barracks

On Skills

- Programming and implementing relevant trainings

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings and conclusions of the study, the following are recommended:

On Strategy

1. Ensure personnel sufficiency at PNP CSU (minimum of 88 PNP CSU personnel) – the Chief PNP CSU must submit a request for the Director, HSS who must, in turn, submit to the Directorate for Personnel and Records Management (DPRM) for the recruitment of new police officers (PO1) or the reassignment to PNP CSU of personnel from other PNP offices/units to improve the manpower of PNP CSU;



2. Ensure equipment sufficiency (by providing PNP CSU with the minimum equipment identified in the proposed TEA (Appendix A) – Chief, PNP CSU must submit to the Director, HSS who must, in turn, endorse to the Directorate for Logistics (DL) the proposed TEA for the approval subsequent endorsement by the Chief PNP and the final approval by the NAPOLCOM. TEA will give a more concrete and compelling basis for the procurement and issuance of identified PNP CSU equipment (including the direly needed additional vehicles) for the use of the latter notwithstanding a change in PNP leadership; and
3. Ensure enhanced security (through semi-annual review and rehearsal of security plans; and strict implementation and monitoring) – this will ensure that security plans are attuned and responsive to the demands and peculiarities of the changing time and circumstances.

On Structure

1. PNP CSU personnel may be considered for deployment to non-PNP CSU functions but on the last priority basis – this will not only spare to some extent PNP CSU personnel from over exhaustion due to overwork but likewise will give an opportunity for them to concentrate their efforts and energy to highly dangerous custodial functions.

On Systems

1. Ensure ready availability of sufficient equipment with mechanism to ensure proper maintenance – this will create the ideal situation where the PNP CSU has at its disposal vital equipment when the need arises and avoid the situation where it still has to request for their availability especially of vehicles from HSS or LSS in order to transport PUCs for court hearings, etc. or to rush them to the hospital during emergency medical conditions;
2. The 150% ratio of escorts to PUCs during court hearings – being the minimum, any fraction should, therefore, be rounded off to the higher whole number of security escorts. This will also make more definitive and higher the ratio of security escorts to the number of PUCs as compared to the present of 1:1+1 which is rather confusing and not easily understood; and



3. Conduct security plan rehearsal, as may be necessary, and ensure strict implementation and monitoring per activity – this is to ensure mastery as regards the role of the respective members of the security contingents to expect a smooth execution of the security plan during its actual implementation.

On Shared Values

1. Adoption by PNP CSU of pro-God, pro-country, pro-people, pro-environment, good attitude, harmony, and accountability as its shared values – the PNP CSU emphasized here good attitude and harmony, despite that by implication the PNP core values when observed religiously would result necessarily to good attitude and harmony, this is because of the fact that PNP CSU functions are highly dangerous. Yet, team efforts are critical, so its personnel must work hand-in-hand to ensure the accomplishment of its objectives. Accountability was added as a caveat to take full responsibility and be answerable over one's actions or inactions which deviate or fall short from its standards.

On Style of Leadership

1. PNP CSU leadership to sustain leadership style being practiced befitting the peculiarities of the situation and giving due consideration to the suggestions of subordinates – this affirms that there is no single leadership style that is best applicable in all situations in PNP CSU; even autocratic leadership has its perfect time in PNP CSU leadership particularly in emergency situations where time defines the success or failure in its operation. However, when the situation allows, suggestions of subordinates should be considered given their expertise acquired through the length of their experiences in the discharge of PNP CSU functions.

On Staff

1. Fill-up all vacant authorized positions following the minimum number of PNP CSU personnel of 88 – this is to ensure that the PNP CSU will function smoothly as far as manpower is concerned. This necessitates putting the right person at the right job giving due regard to the preferences of the personnel as well as their career development;
2. Include PNP CSU personnel among the beneficiaries of Combat Duty Pay or equivalent benefits/allowances – this will boost their morale that could translate to high-quality



outputs; while PNP CSU is under an administrative mother unit (HSS) and it is not engaged in offensive actions in the discharge of its duties, the danger, however, is even higher in PNP CSU, if not the same as those in operational units of the PNP. It is a fact that in offensive operations, the operating units dictate and control at least the time, place, and manner of operation, but the PNP CSU is in the defensive position, and it is the lawless elements who wish to stage a rescue or ambush who are in the offensive position. When these lawless elements engage the PNP CSU, the latter cannot refuse combat as it is obligated to fight back at least a defensive combat. Therefore, PNP CSU is in a more dangerous position than those operating units of the PNP. Accordingly, PNP CSU personnel deserve combat duty pay entitlement. And

3. Ensure the exclusive use by PNP CSU personnel of their barracks. In essence, this is rather basic due to security reasons and to avoid unnecessary congestion in the barracks that runs contrary to habitability.

On Skills

1. Program and implement relevant trainings for continuing skills development to PNP CSU personnel – this is very important since PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities, the danger against the lives of the security escorts as well as the PUCs is very high. Hence, a higher level of competencies in handling high-risk personalities is essential to ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU.
2. To adopt the action plan and project as an offshoot of the study.

Action Plan and Project Matrix

Objective	Major Activity	Expected Results and Success Indicators	Person/ Group Responsible	Time Frame	Potential Obstacles/ Constraints	Preventive/ Contingency Action	Budget
Adoption and implementation	Crafting of endorsement and	High effectiveness and	Researchers DAP	2 nd Sem 2017	• Non-approval and non-	• Prepare a letter for and DAP	As provided by the PNP



<p>ntation of the standards for the PNP CSU</p>	<p>actual endorsement for the adoption and implementation of the standards</p>	<p>efficiency of PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities</p>	<p>PPSC CPNP D, HSS C, PNP CSU</p>		<p>endorsement for adoption and implementation of the standards</p>	<p>PPSC requesting approval and endorsement of the standards for the adoption and implementation by PNP CSU</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prepare a memo to be signed by the CPNP directing the Director, HSS to cause the adoption and implementation by PNP CSU of the standards 	
<p>Ensuring equipment sufficiency</p>	<p>Crafting and endorsement of Table of Equipment and Allowance (TEA)</p>	<p>Approved TEA by the NAPOLCOM</p>	<p>Researchers PNP CSU Officers & Staff C, PNP CSU HSS Officers</p>	<p>2nd Sem 2017 to 2018</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-approval of proposed TEA • Discontinuity of inconsistency in the implementation of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Send a letter request to Chief, PNP CSU in advance to set formal time appointment in finalizing the proposed 	<p>As provided by PNP</p>



					standards due to change in leadership	the Table of Equipment and Allowance (TEA) <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Request Chief, PNP CSU to sign memo endorsing proposed TEA to Director, HSS, who shall, in turn, endorse the same to the Chief, PNP and the NAPOLCOM for final approval• Submit a parallel request for procuremen t of needed vehicles due to the urgency of their necessity, despite their being part of the TEA• Upon approval of	
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						<p>the TEA, PNP CSU to submit a request for the procurement and issuance of all equipment listed therein less those that are already in the PNP CSU inventory</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adoption of “Continuity Policy” per the directive of Pres. Duterte 	
Ensure personnel sufficiency at PNP CSU	Crafting of justification letter for the need of CSU personnel addressed to DPRM with the accompanying request for PO1 recruitment quota	Vacant positions filled up, either thru recruitment of PO1s or reassignment of those already in the service	PNP CSU Officers and Staff ARMD, HSS DPRM	2017-2018	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-allocation of quota to HSS for PO1 recruitment • Unwillingness of PNP personnel to be assigned to PNP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Justification letter for the need of PNP CSU personnel addressed to DPRM with accompanying request for PO1 recruitment quota allocation or assignment 	As provided by PNP for the recruitment of new PO1s



	allocation or assignment of a number of personnel				CSU	of an identified number of personnel	
PNP CSU security enhancement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formulation of Security Plans including contingency plans • Semi-annual review and implementation rehearsal • Intensified implementation monitoring to ensure the success of operations and for further improvement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhanced PNP CSU Security • Familiarization of PNP CSU personnel of their role in every contingency plan • Safe and secured CSU personnel and PUCs while off-camp 	PNP CSU Officers and Staff IID, HSS D, HSS	2 nd Sem 2017 and onwards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hesitation / Inconsistency in the conduct of regular review, rehearsal, strict implementation of security plans, and monitoring and evaluation • Conflict of duty of personnel for the rehearsal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advance review of all security plans • Inclusion of the major activities in PNP CSU scorecard • Advance scheduling of activities • Inclusion in the HSS manual of operation of provisions mandating the conduct of Semi-annual review and implementation rehearsals and Intensified implementation monitoring 	As provided by HSS



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Amendment of the present ratio 1:1+1 of security escort to PUC in the HSS Manual to 150% 					to ensure operations success and for further improvement	
Giving last priority consideration to PNP CSU personnel for deployment to non-CSU tasks	Approval by the CPNP for the adoption and implementation of the standards guarantees faithful implementation	PNP CSU personnel could focus efforts on CSU functions, and their deployment for non-CSU functions will come only after exhausting other HSS personnel	C, PNP CSU ARMD, HSS	2 nd Sem 2017	Simultaneous tasks of HSS deploying all personnel from the different offices	Advance information to Headquarters HSS about the duty detail of CSU	
Ensuring ready availability of needed equipment	Issuance of equipment to individual personnel of those always needed	Equipment readily available when needed	PNP CSU Supply Personnel C, PNP CSU	2 nd Sem 2017	Improper storage and poor maintenance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regular inspection by Chief, CSU Regular maintenance check-up and 	



	equipment and proper storage and maintenance to ensure operationality and ease of use as the need erupts					inventory by CSU supply personnel	
Ensuring adoption by PNP CSU of the standard shared values	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inclusion in PNP CSU performance governance system of these shared values • Inclusion in the personnel information and continuing education (PICE) of their significance • Regular 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PNP CSU personnel will be pro-God, pro-country, pro-people, pro-environment and they will further exemplify among themselves the imperatives of good attitude, harmony, and accounta 	All PNP CSU Personnel	2 nd Sem 2017	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low spirited CSU personnel might disregard the shared values • Non-availability of lecturer or spiritual leader 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct of regular PICE giving sound-bite refresh on the shared values • Advance invitation of lecturers on moral values enhancement 	



	values formatio n activities	bility • Limited cases of complain ts by the staff					
Ensuring PNP CSU leadershi p to sustain leadershi p style attuned to the peculiarit ies of the demand- ing situation and giving due consider ation to the suggestio ns of subordin ates	PNP CSU leaders to imbibe the spirit of this standard to develop mastery in the right leadership style practice	• Highly effective and efficient leadershi p in PNP CSU • More inputs provided by subordin ate personne l in decision- making	PNP CSU Leaders	2 nd Se m 2017	Spontaneou s and uncontrolled contrary attitude/ behavior of PNP CSU leaders	Emphasize shared values through PICE and in practice. This means that those who cannot measure these standards must face the last shared value of accountability.	
		• Security objective s are met/no					



		escapes, and the morale of personne l is high.					
Filling-up of vacant authorize d positions following the identifie d minimu m number of CSU personne l of 88	Issuance of orders designating PNP CSU personnel to vacant positions in accordance with the identified minimum number of CSU personnel of 88	CSU operations backed by full manpower compleme nt, thus higher level of effectivene ss as they will be unburdene d of their heavy workload	PNP CSU Officers and Staff	Start- ing 2 nd Se m 2017 and as additi onal PNP CSU perso nnel may arrive	Skills mismatch	Ensure that personnel are designated in accordance with the line of their expertise or skills	
Including PNP CSU personne l among combat duty pay beneficia ries or similar privilege	Submit a request for inclusion of CSU personnel in the combat duty pay beneficiari es citing the critical nature of its function as justificatio	PNP CSU personnel motivation is high that could translate into high performan ce and effectivene ss	PNP CSU Officers and Staff D, HSS Directorial Staff Concerned CPNP	2 nd Se m 2017	CSU nature of work in addition to its being under administrati ve support unit might not fall within the justifications for the grant of combat duty pay or similar	CSU personnel be given priority for deployment to operating units entitled to combat duty pay after rendering a certain number of predetermine d years of service in CSU, as CSU	



	n				privilege	personnel may wish. Their replacement shall be worked out by HSS from among its personnel or requested from DPRM	
Ensuring the exclusive use by PNP CSU personnel of CSU barracks	Issuing directive from D, HSS for non-CSU personnel to vacate CSU barracks	Another motivational point for PNP CSU personnel if their barracks are already exclusive for them, thus could also translate into high effectiveness of PNP CSU	PNP CSU Staff C, PNP CSU D, HSS	2 nd September 2017	Lack of barracks for the non-CSU personnel in their respective offices/units	It has to be made clear that non-CSU personnel should not be occupying CSU barracks for security reasons	
Programming and implementing relevant trainings for continuing skills	Crafting of programs and their implementation of relevant trainings for continuing	Improved performance of PNP CSU personnel	PNP CSU Officers and Staff HSS Staff D, HSS	2 nd September 2017	Lack or limited budget to defray expenses for seminars or trainings	Advance presentation of the request for approval of D, HSS through the Financial Management Division	As provided by HSS



develop ment to PNP CSU personne l	skills developme nt						
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This action plan and project matrix shows the proposed standards to ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities. It covered the seven areas in the McKinsey model, such as strategy, structures, systems, shared values, style of leadership, staff, and their skills. The proposed standards are based on the results of this study. It is expected that several tangible and intangible outputs will be produced such as the establishment of Table of Equipment and Allowance (TEA), personnel and equipment sufficiency, an enhanced PNP CSU security plan, safe and secured CSU personnel and PUC while off-camp with the application of 150% CSU escort personnel to PUC, the right size of the PNP CSU personnel, giving last priority consideration to PNP CSU personnel for deployment to non-PNP CSU functions, the ready availability of sufficient equipment, conduct of security plan rehearsals and strict implementation and monitoring, adoption of PNP and PNP CSU core values, appropriate leadership style giving due consideration to the suggestions of subordinates, fill-up of vacant authorized positions with the minimum number of PNP CSU personnel of 88, and benefits of said personnel which are calculated to result in zero escapes, and less complaints, enthusiasm and highly improved performance on the part of PNP CSU personnel.

In realizing these standards, it is imperative that all concerned (HSS officers and staff, PNP CSU officers, staff, and security and escort personnel) must be active participants or must have a sense of "ownership" of these standards. To effectively facilitate, however, the realization of these standards, which the researchers are proposing, specific concrete actions have to be in place. Thus, a letter was drafted to be offered for the signature of the Dean Graduate School of Public Development and Management, DAP endorsing to the Chief PNP the adoption and implementation of these standards in the PNP CSU. Once the Chief PNP gives his imprimatur thereon, the adoption and implementation of all the standards under the entire elements of the Mckinsey model will follow as a matter of course. But, to further ease up said adoption and implementation, the proposed TEA with accompanying



endorsement had been crafted to be presented for the signature of the Chief, PNP CSU, and going up the ladder until finally approved by the National Police Commission.

Other enabling actions to be undertaken by identified offices/officers include the crafting by the Chief, PNP CSU of a memorandum requesting for additional personnel to complete the minimum PNP CSU personnel of 88 citing the findings of this research as one of the bases; inclusion in the HSS manual of operation of provisions mandating the conduct of the semi-annual review and implementation rehearsals and intensified implementation monitoring to ensure PNP CSU operations success and for further improvement; Chief, PNP CSU submission of a request for inclusion of PNP CSU personnel among the beneficiaries of combat duty pay or equivalent benefits with proper justification; Chief, PNP CSU drafting a directive for the signature of the Director HSS disallowing the use by non-PNP CSU personnel of PNP CSU barracks; and crafting by the Chief, PNP CSU of continuing programs for skills development and upgrading for PNP CSU personnel relative to the handling of high-risk personalities.

The major concern in establishing these standards is the continuity as may be disrupted by new leadership. But to address this, the standards must conform to the “continuity program” of the Duterte administration with the idea that governments’ standards must be continuing, even with the change in leadership.

The overarching plan is to have the recommended standards covering all elements of the Mckinsey 7S to ensure the smooth functioning or operations of the PNP CSU, thus leading to its becoming a highly effective and efficient. Differently stated, the Mckinsey 7S is "all or nothing" if we are to expect an excellent result. For an organization to perform well, these seven elements need to be aligned and mutually reinforcing. (https://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newSTR_91.htm) This explains the quite extensive breadth of these recommendations, and still, with a further note that these are just the minimum required standards to ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities.

It follows that further leveling up may still be done in all of the standards as fittingly determined, especially during periodic review specified under the proposal for sustainability. However, the priority plan is to have a Table of Expenditure and Allowance



for the PNP CSU. Attached in Appendix A is the Memorandum for the TEA. The TEA is based on the summarized results of the Document Analysis, Focus Group Discussion, and Key Informants Interview. Part of the TEA is the requirement for the procurement and subsequent issuance to PNP CSU of the identified needed vehicles, hence a parallel request, therefore, will be simultaneously dispatched, notwithstanding the pendency of the TEA processing and approval given the urgency of this concern on the vehicle.

Project Overview and Design

With reference to Table 26, the objectives of this APP are the adoption and implementation in CSU of the standards identified in all the elements of the McKinsey 7S in the hope of ensuring the high effectiveness and efficiency of the PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities. While it appears too extensive, the entirety thereof is a must to ensure that all parts of the PNP CSU will work in harmony as we intend for its high effectiveness and efficiency. To make this happen, the researchers will seek the approval and endorsement of DAP and PPSC for the PNP to implement the standards in CSU starting the 2nd semester of 2017. Given the urgency of the need for the additional vehicle by the PNP CSU, a parallel request for vehicle procurement and issuance to PNP CSU will be made to go simultaneously with the endorsement and approval process of the TEA, notwithstanding that vehicle requirement is part of the TEA. Along this line, the support of the PNP leadership will likewise be sought as it requires fund allocation not only for the procurement but also for the continuing maintenance requirements.

Proposal for Sustainability

Sustainability of the standards for ensuring a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities depends not only upon relying on the “continuity” program of the government. The unit must also revise the standards as needed with the changes of times and situations. Hence, one of the proposals is to conduct a review every three years to update, revise, or reaffirm the contents of the standards.

Strategic Implications to Security and Development

One of the major questions is the strategic need for a custodial facility for the PNP.

How does this lead to security and development?

Suffice it to say that there are personalities that need a higher level of security like high ranking government officials and high-risk private persons under custody. Therefore, there will always be a need for a facility that is highly secured.

The establishment of these standards in the PNP CSU is an exercise in proposing good governance measures. The standards may be adopted in other jails or detention facilities.

As the framework below shows, governance is interlinked with security and development. By securing high-risk personalities, the probability of disruptions or threats to the society may be lowered. An image of an effective and efficient PNP CSU can also lead to productivity, peace, and prosperity. Productivity is obtained by having zero escapees, zero harm to the detainees and police personnel, and less expenditures in the operations. Peace is attained when there are fewer high-risk personalities roaming the streets. Prosperity is enabled in a peaceful environment.




Figure 4. Framework for Development and Security

(Source: Mercado, 2016)

Suggestions for Further Studies

Further studies are suggested to be done regarding PNP CSU facilities, other detention facilities, and in jails or prisons. The model, however, is comprehensive enough that the methods can also be used in other government agencies. Future researchers may focus on



only one aspect of the McKinsey 7-s model. This is to ensure that the research is more in-depth.

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